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I , .. 
PREFACE 
Thi~ thesis is an attempt to bring togetller in brief form the operations 
of the United States Navy during the Mexican War, In this conflict the Navy 
was divided into two squadrons: the Home Squadron operating in the Gulf of 
Mexico, and the Pacific Squadron operating off the coast of California and the 
West Coast of Mexico, The major problem has been to select the pertinent 
documentation for the many events which occurred, and to arrange it into 
readable for~, Because there has been so little written on this subject, few 
people realize the important role the Navy and Marine Corps played in our 
country's expansion during the era of Manifest Destiny. 
I would like to ta~e this opportunity to express my appreciation for the 
prompting, encouragement, and many helpful suggestions given by my adviser 
Dr. Odie B. Faulk. Professor George F. Jewsbury made a number of helpful 
suggestions and corrections which µave helped to clarify the text. In addition 
I wo~ld like to express my thanks to Joan Neal for her patience and excellence 
of typing. 
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When hostilities commenced between the United States and Mexico on 
April 24, 1846, the Americans did not have a navy adequate to prosecute a war 
in foreign waters. The inadequacies of the United States Navy in size, com-
munications, training, and supplies were not generally known. It was divided 
into two general squadrons; the Home Squadron, which was responsible for 
the Atlantic, including the West Indies, the African Coast1 the Mediterranean 
area, and the East Coast of America, commanded by Commodore David 
Conner; and the Pacific Squadron, which patrolled the Western Coast of North 
and South America and the Orient, commanded by Commodore James Biddle. 1 
There was a shortage of ships at all times with which to conduct the 
naval operations of the Mexican War. This was particularly true of vessels of 
light draft, which were needed to cross the shallow sand bars of the Mexican 
ports. On paper the United States, in November of 1846, possessed a total of 
eighty-one ships--eleven ships-of-the-line, fourteen frigates, one razee, 
twenty-four sloops, six brigs, nine schooners, twelve steamers, and four· 
1House Executive Document 2, 28th Congress, 2nd sessicm, Vol. l, 
Serial 46~ 540, Personnel records show that Captain was the highest of-
oficial rank at this time. Commodore was an honorary title for senior naval 
officers in command of a squadron. 
1 
storeships. Of this total, however, only sixty-three were available for com-
bat service. 2 
2 
· Two seventy-gun ships-of-the-line, the Ohio and the Columbus, under 
Commodore James Biddle, were in the Orient. Three ships, the fifty-four gun 
frigate United States, the sloop Marion with twenty-two guns, and the store-
ship Southampton with only two guns, were on the African station to check the 
trade in slaves. At the Brazilian station was the frigate Columbia, with forty-
four guns, and the Bainbridge, carrying six guns. An additional eleven ships 
were stationed at various U. S. ports. 3 
Communications and supplies were a major problem at all times. The 
three months required to send a message from Washington to the commander 
of the squadron off the California Coast was a source of endless confusion and 
misunderstanding. Supplyi:Qg these ships was an even greater problem than 
communications. The supply problem became even more serious when hostil-
ities commenced as there were only four store ships to service the entire 
navy. 4 These were the Relief, assigned to the Home Squadron, the Erie and 
Lexington, assigned to the Pacific fleet, and the Southampton which supplied 
2House Executive Document 4, 29th Congress, 2nd session, Vol. 1. 
Serial 497, pp. 465-469. Herein after cited as HE:O 4. The total number of 
ships in commission varied during the war. - -
3~obert Wilden Neeser, Statistical ~ Chronological History of ~ 
United States Nav;y !.1.Z.£,-1J!.Q!, (2 "{rols., New York: The Macmillan Company, 
1909), II, pp. Bi-72. 
4 Justin H. Smith. The War With Mexico, (2 vols., New York: The 
Macmillan Company, 1919):-T." p:-196.°""" · 
3 
the ships assigned to the African station. 5 
Even the supplying of a ship at the Pensacola, Florida Naval Yard was 
costly in terms of the time involved. On one occasion it took four weeks to 
supply the Potomac with sufficient bread for a three-month cruise. For ships 
stationed in the Gulf of Mexico it took a month to make the round trip to Pensa-
cola for supplies. 6 Even fresh water was hard to obtain at Pensacola. The 
problem of supplying ships on extended tours of duty in the Pacific was far 
greater than that of the home fleet. When a ship left its home port for a long 
cruise, it carried rations and water only for a limited time.· The commander 
of the ship was provided with funds for the necessary purohases that were made 
during the tour of duty. The health of the ere ws was a constant problem: 
scurvy and fever were threats to the sailors. Procuring clothes was a must, 
although shoes could be made from ship's canvas--as was the case with the 
crews of the ships stationed in the Pacific during the Mexican War. 7 
United States vessels were designed exclusively for war, but a long 
confinement at sea impaired the efficiency of the men. The initial supplies 
had to be constantly supplemented by any means. Livestock was carried to 
provide fresh meat, while new supplies of beans, wheat, and flour were bought 
when possible. 8 To aid in financing these purchases for the fleet, foreign 
5 
HED !, p. 466. 
6smith, The~· With Mexico, II, p. 196. 
7 Clyde H. Metcalf, ~ History of~ United States Marine Cores, (New 
York; G. Putnam's Sons, 1939), p. 151. 
8stephen C. Rowan, "Recollections of the Mexican War," . United 
States Naval Institute Proceedings, XIV (1888), pp. 543-545. 
4 
customhouses in times of war were seized and their revenues used. Such an 
example occurred during the l\([exican War when the Pacific Squadron occupied 
Mazatl~n, Mexico, where over $200,000 was collected in five mohths. 9 
Additionally a shortage of small arms existed in the Navy during most 
of the war. For the early part of the California campaign there were approxi-
mately ninety muskets for the 350 sailors and Marines who took part in the 
expedition to retake Los Angeles. There were some carbines and pistols, but 
not enough. lO Efficient small arms continued to be scarce throughout most of 
the war, at least in the Pacific Squadron. On November 11, 1846, Commodore 
David Conner, writing to Secretary of War John Y. Mason, requested an 
additional five hundred muskets for the Home Squadron. 11 
There are a number of ;reasons for this shortage of small arms on 
warships although there apparently was no real paucity of arms in the naval 
depots. Several ships in the Pacific Squadron were on duty before the war 
commenced and therefore could not readily be supplied. Although the navy had 
anticipated war as early as 1842, it nevertheless had failed to arm the crews 
with sufficient small arms. Obviously naval crews were not expected to fight 
on land and thus were armed with pistols, cutlasses, and boarding pikes, which 
9samuel F. DuPont, "The War With Mexico: The Cruise of the U. S. 
Ship Cyane During the Years 1845-48. " From the papers of her commander, 
the late Rear-Admiral S. F. DuPont. United States Naval Institute Proceed-
ings, VIII, no. 3 (December, 1882), p. 430. 
lOEdgar Stanton Macley, -1:, History of~ United States ~ From 
1775 to 1893, (3 vols., New York: D. Appleton and Company, 1893), pp. 76-77. 
11Philip S. P. Conner, The Home Squadron Under Commodore Conner 
in the War With Mexico. (Philadelphia, 1896), p. · 15 fn 1. --~-
5 
were standard arms for the crew of a war vessel. The one exception would be 
the Marine detachments found on American vessels of war. High ranking 
Naval officers in Washington obviously did not anticipate the role that sailors 
would play in the acquisition of California and the war on the East Coast of 
Mexico. 
Ordinance, food, and clothing were not the only problems which plagued 
the Navy Department. The Department was poorly organized and was not 
ready to conduct a war it had been anticipating for n;iore than two years. Three 
months after the war began, the first cargo of coal reached the Pensacola 
Naval Yard. 12 This was critical because the early steamers were notoriously 
inefficient in their use of fuel. Possibly this was the reason for not assigning 
steamers to the Pacific Squadron during the war. 
In an attempt to meet the needs of the Navy, as well as the Army, 
Congress passed the War Bill of May 13, 1846. This appropriated $11,000,000 
for the Navy. The Secretary of the Navy was instructed to complete all vessels 
then being built, and to purchase or charter, arms, equip, and man such ships 
and steamboats as he may think proper to convert into armed vessels. 
The Marine Corps, an integral part of the Navy, was in the same gen-
erally poor condition. At the outset of the war the Corps numbered approxi-
mately 1,178 enlisted men and fifty nine officers. 13 In October of 1848, the 
12Dudley W. Knox, ~ History of the Uriited States ~, (New York: 
G, P. Putnam's Sons, 1936), p. 170. 
13House Executive Document 67, 30th Congress, 1st session, Vol. 8. 
Serial 521, p. 2. -
6 
Corps numbered 897 enlisted men, still 1,502 men short of what Congress bad 
provided for by the act of March 2, 1847. In addition the act provided for 
seventy five officers--a total of 2; 324 enlisted men and seventy five officers.14 
Despite the general state of unpreparedness the Navy and Marine Corps 
played an important role in the political and territorial expansion of the United 
States from 1846 through 1848. The war in the Pacific was almost exclusively 
a naval conquest, while the invasion of Mexico by two armies was given in-
valuable support by the Home Squadron. On both coasts the right naval block-
ade of Mexican ports brought economic pressure to bear on the enemy. For-
tunately for the United States Navy, the Mexican Navy was all but non-existent. 
It was comprised of thirty four ships, mostly sm1;1ll vessels, which were 
quickly swept from the ocean and gave no real opposition. There were no 
naval duels between the United States ships and Mexican vessels in this war. 
The intent of this thesis is threefold: to examine this dual role of 
direct warfare and supporting operations assumed by the United States Navy 
during the war with Mexico; to show that the occupation of California was a 
purposeful goal of the United States government; and to prove that the Navy 
had a direct and equally i:rp.portant role in the subjugation of Mexico itself by 
means of an effective blockade. 
14These figures are based on the following two acts: Act of June 30, 
1834, ~ Public Statures !! Large ~~United States, ~ America, !.1§! ~ 
. March 3, 1845, Richard Peters, ed., (82 vols., Boston: Charles c. Little 
and James Brown, 1850), Vol. 4, pp. 712-714; Act of March 2, 1847, Statutes 
M Large and Treaties .2f the United States 2! America, December L 1845, _!£ 
March 3, 1851. George Minot, ed., (82 vols., Boston: Little, Brown and 
Company, 1854), Vol. 9, pp. 154-155. 
CHAPTER II 
THE PACIFIC SQUADRON. 
Mexican fears as to the American intentions in her northern territories, 
extending from Matamoras to the Sea of California, were well founded histor""' 
ically. In 1835 Andrew Jackson had proposed the purchse of San Francisco 
Bay and in this proposal Mexico saw unli:,;nited Yankee expansion. When John 
Tyler became president in 1841 he quickly reaffirmed American interest in 
the Mexican Province of California through his minister to Mexico, Waddy 
Thompson, James K. Polk was certainly in fi).vor of acquiring California and 
there is little doubt that he was an ardent expansionist. To the Mexicans, 
and many others, he deliberately provoked war for the single purpose of 
seizing California. 
In all probability only a few traders, merchants, and politicians were 
well informed on the economic possibilities existing in California at the be-
ginning of the Mexican War. The American people as a whole were not that 
well informed about California nor did they care that much about its future. 
However, it would have been extremely difficult to have convinced the Mexi-
can government of this when on October 20, 1842, Commodore Thomas ap. 
Catesby Jones, commander of the Pacific fleet off California, landed an armed 
party of 150 men, under the command of Commander Cornelius K. Stribling, 
to take possession of Monterey, California. Jones mistakenly thought the 
United States and Mexico were at war, but when he realized his mistake he 
apologized and retired as gracefully as was possible under the circumstances. 
7 
8 
This did not settle the matter, however, and in order to placate the Mexican 
government Jones was recalled, but never officially censured. 1 Commodore 
Jones' ill-timed attempt to claim California for the United States has often 
been cited as proof by historians, that the United States Naval officers in the 
Pacific had standing orders to occupy California in case of war between Mexico 
and the United States to prevent Great Britain from occupying it. 
An important link in American-Californian relations was Thomas 
Oliver Larkin, maritime merchant, trader, friend of the Californians, and the 
United States Consul at Monterey. Larkin had come to California in 1832 and 
in the intervening years had industriously worked for the peaceful annexation 
of California by the United States. 2 
The political situation in California in the early months of 1846 was 
marked by internal jealousy and rivalry. Governor Manuel Micheltorena was 
expelled in February of 1845 and the man who succeeded him as governor, Pio 
Pico, moved the capitol from Monterey to Los Angeles. This revived ancient 
feuds over the location of the government and division of the spoils of office. 
General JosJ Castro of Monterey, who controlled the treasury and the military 
departments of California, was Pio Pico's chief rival. Pico and Castro were 
so involved in their personal quarrel that they were unable to present a unified 
effort to stem the growing menace of foreign invasion. By the time Pico and 
1George M. Brooke, Jr., "The Vest Pocket War of Commodore Jones," 
Pacific Historical Review, XXXI (August, 1962), p. 233. 
2Thomas O. Larkin, The Larkin Papers, ed., George P. Hammond, 
(10 vols., Berkley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1965), 
V, pp. V-IX preface. 
9 
Castro, along with their followers, could bring themselves together in May, 
1846, time had run out, Two events were to take place which would nullify 
any actions taken by the two factions in California and which would change the 
course of California history. War between the United States and Mexico was 
the major event and the Bear Flag Revolt of June, 1846, in California was the 
immediate cause for concern among the Californians. Even then they were 
unable to present a unified front. 
Initial action in the Bear Flag Revolt was led by Ezekiel Merritt and 
William B. Ide. Captain John Charles Frimont who, with his "topographical 
engineers," had been camped near Klamath Lake, Oregon, immediately re-
signed his commission as a United States Army officer and joined the revolt. 
This action, on the part of Fremont, would seem to have been unnecessary as 
the men who were involved in the Bear Flag Revolt were from his camp. 
The atmosphere of uncertainty, bitterness, and rivalry was only par-
tially dispelled with the arrival, off Monterey, of Commodore John D. Sloat 
in the American warship Savannah on July 2, 1846. Commodore Sloat imme-
diately conferred with Consul Larkin concerning the course to be followed 
with respect to the occupation of California. Contrary to general opinion Lar-
kin did not influence Sloat to take immediate official action and declare Cali-
fornia a part of the United States. Actually he wanted Sloat to wait two or 
three weeks before taking any official action, 3 Apparently Larkin hoped to 
off set the Bear Flag Revolt and bring about a peaceful settlement with the 
3Ibid. , p. 181. 
10 
Californians who were greatly upset by the imprisonment of Mariano Guadalupe 
Vallejo, a prominent citizen of Sonoma, who had been taken prisone:t' by 
Ezekiel Merritt and approximately twenty men from Fremont's camp. 
On June 24, 1845, Secretary of the Navy George Bancroft had sent a 
dispatch to Commodore Sloat with specific instructions that in the event of war 
between the United States and Mexico he was to occupy the Port of San Fran-
cisco and other such ports as his naval forces would permit. 4 Apparently 
this was understood to include Monterey and San Diego. These were the only 
orders that Sloat actually received from Secretary Bancroft; although almost 
identical orders were sent him on June 8, 1846, he never received them. 5 
On July 12, 1846, Bancroft sent Sloat further instructions, which he 
did not receive; subsequently he did know it existed. This message stated 
that " .•• the object of the U. S. under its rights as a belligerent nation, is 
to possess itself entirely of Upper California. . • the object of the United 
States had reference to ultimate peace with Mexico; and if, at the peace the 
basis of the uti possidetis shall be established, the government expects, 
through your forces to be found in actual possession of California. 116 This 
order had been the focal point of much criticism directed toward the United 
States government to prove that it had plans for the acquisition of California 
prior to the commencement of hostilities. Hubert H. Bancroft (collector of 
4House Executive pocument 60. 30th Congress, 1st session, Serial 
520, p. 231. -
5rbid. , p. 237. 
6Ibid. , p. 238. 
11 
histories) stated that the United States government had plainly given such or-
ders and it remained only for the principal people involved to interpret and to 
act as they saw best. 7 
President James K. Polk and Secretary of War William L. Macy made 
plain their intentions when they commissioned Colonel Jonathan D. Stevenson 
of New York to organize the New York Volunteer Regiment. The members of 
this regiment were to be armed with the tools of their trade as well as their 
rifles. They further agreed to accept their discharge in California or in the 
nearest American territory at the close of the war. Here was a combined 
colonizing-military expedition with the clear, but unstated, purpose of 
pioneering in a new territory. 8 
Commodore Sloat was slow to act on his orders of June 24, 1845. No 
doubt he remembered Jones' embarrassment; also his original orders made it 
clear that a state of war must exist before he occupied any of the California 
ports. The need for making a decision was very much present in the form of 
British Admiral Sir George E. Seymour and his Majesty's Ship The Colling-
wood 80. It was the confirmed belief of many that England wanted to occupy 
California. Mexico was greatly in debt to British capitalists who had enlisted 
the aid of their government to collect their debts. To this end England, had 
attempted to attach California as security until Mexico could meet its financial 
7 Hubert Howe Bancroft, History of California, (7 vols., San Francisco: 
The History Company Publishers, 1886);-'""V, p. 198. 
8Norman A. Graebner, Empire On~ Pacific, (New York: Ronald 
Press Co., 1955), p. 156. 
12 
obligations. In the spring of 1846 the American Pacific Squadron was at 
Mazatlan, Mexico, supposedly being watched by the British. Naval surgeon 
William Maxwell Wood and John Parrott, the American Consul at Mazatlan, 
heard that hostilities had commenced; Wood lost no time in relaying the news, 
by messenger, to Commodore Sloat anchored off Mazatl:in. 9 
Sloat later wrote to Wood that his information was the deciding factor 
in his carrying out his official orders to occupy California in the event of 
war. 10 He was still hesitant to commence hostilities. However, on May 17, 
1846, he dispatched the Cyane, commanded by Captain William Mervine, to 
Monterey, California, but he remained at Mazatl,n until news arrived that 
the Navy had blockaded the Mexican East Coast port of Vera Cruz. Not until 
June 7, did Sloat finally set sail for Monterey in his flagship Savannah. He 
arrived off Monterey July 2, 1846, where he joined the Warren, the Cyane, 
and the Levant, and learned that the Portsmouth was anchored off San 
Francisco. 
Commodore Sloat, although still doubtful, accepted the advice of his 
officers and made preparations to raise the flag over Monterey. Early on the 
morning of July 7, 1846, Captain Mervine with a combined force of 165 sailors 
and eighty five Marines landed and took possession of Monterey. The Stars 
and Stripes were raised over the custom-house by Passed Midshipman Edward 
9Frank M. Bennett, The Steam~ of~ United States, (Pittsburg: 
Warren and Company, 1896), pp. 89-90. 
10 Bancroft, History e!' California, V, p. 202 fn. 
13 
Higgins and Midshipman William P. Toler. 11 Appropriate salutes were fired 
by the Savannah, the Levant, and the Cyane. Commander Sloat's proclamation 
was read to the inhabitants. The proclamation read stated; 
"I declare to the inhabitants of California that although I 
come in arms with a powerful force, I do not come among them 
as an enemy to California, but on the contrary, I come as their 
best friend-as henceforth California will be a portion of the 
United States and its peaceable inhabitants will enjoy the same 
rights and priveleges as the citizens of any portion of that nation, 
with the rights and priveleges they now enjoy, together with the 
privelege of choosing their own Magistrates and other officers 
for the administration of Justice among themselves, and the 
same protection will be extended to them as to any other state 
of the Union, They will also enjoy a permanent government under 
which life, property and the constitutional rights and lawful se-
curity, to worship the Creator in a way most congenial to each 
one's sense of duty will be secure . . . all persons holding title 
to real estate, or in quiet possession of lands, under color of 
right shall have those titles and rights guaranteed to them. All 
churches and the property they contain in possession of the 
Clergy of California, shall continue in the same rights and pos-
session they now enjoy. 
All provisions and supplies of every kind furnished by the 
inhabitants for the use of the United States, Ships and Soldiers 
will be paid for at fair rates, and no private property will be 12 
taken for public use without just compensation at the moment. " 
After the ceremony the sailors returned to their ships. Marine Captain Ward 
Marston and a Marine detachment remained ashore to establish a permanent 
garrison, The Mexican Commandant of Monterey, Mariano Silva, had refused 
to officially surrender the town to Commodore Sloat claiming he had no author-
ity to do so. He referred Sloat to the commanding general of California, Jose 
11Aubrey Nesham, "Flag-Raising At Monterey, July 7, 1846," 
California Historical Society Quarterly, XXV (December, 1946), p. 196. 
12House Executive Document 1, 30th Congress, 2nd session, Vol. 1 
Serial 537, pp. 1010-1011. Herein after cited as HED .!.· 
14 
Castro, who was at Los Angeles. In response to a demand from Sloat to sur-
reI).der Castro informed him that he would defend California against all United 
States forces with the utmost zeai. 13 
Commander John B. Montgomery of the Portsmouth was directed to 
raise the flag at San Francisco. With seventy men Montgomery landed and 
raised the flag in the public square in front of the custom-house at San 
Francisco, A twenty one gun salute was fired, three rousing cheers were 
given, and San Francisco was taken. Marine Lieutenant Henry B. Watson and 
twenty six Marines remained on shore as a garrison. To further strengthen 
the occupation forces, a l0cal civilian militia was organized. Lieutenant 
Watson continued as military commander until November of 1846, during 
which time he constructed Fort Mervine, a block building which cost $140. 00. 
The fort was built as a base from which to defend San Francisco and the sur-
rounding country from the Californians. 14 On Thursday July 9, Montgomery 
sent Lieutenant James W. Revere, and a naval shore party, in the ship's boat 
to Sonoma to raise the flag and to remain in command, which was for the next 
four· months. 
Commodore Sloat was military commander of California from July 7, 
1846, to July 23, 1846, a total of sixteen days. During those sixteen days 
Monterey and San Francisco were occupied. The American flag was raised at 
Sonoma, Sutters Fort, the Pueblo of San Jose, and the mission of San Juan. 
13Ibid., pp. 1012-1013. 
;L4Senate Document 1, 29th Congress, 2nd session, Vol. 1, Serial 493, 
pp. 663-664, Herein after cited as SD 1. 
15 
A communications patrol under Purser D. Fauntleroy, consisting of thirty five 
volunteers from the ships and citizens ashore, was organized to reconnoiter 
the country between Monterey and San Francisco and to keep land communica-
tions open between the two towns. 
On July 23, 1846, Commodore John D. Sloat--old, sick, overdue for 
leave, and worried about his responsibilities, turned over his command to 
Commodore Robert F. Stockton. Sloat transferred his flag to the Levant and 
sailed for the East Coast by way of Mazatl~n and Panama, believing there 
would be no further resistance to the occupation of California. In this, how-
ever, he was mistaken. Had Sloat's proclamation been carried out by Commo-
dore Stockton, considerable trouble might have been avoided. His conciliatory 
military attitude was very different from Stockton's militant stance. 15 
Commodore Stockton's first act was to issue a new proclamation which 
was harsh and accusing. He denounced the Mexican government as being the 
aggressor against the United States. Commandant Jose Castro was censured 
for his retalitory attitude toward FrJmont and his men. According to Stockton, 
Monterey and San Francisco had become scenes of rapine, murder, and blood-
shed which necessitated strict martial law. Castro was branded a thief, 
usurper, and traitor to his people. 16 Stockton's next move was to muster 
Fremont and Marine Lieutenant Archibald H. Gillespie, along with their Bear 
15HED 1, pp. 1035-1037. FrJmont and Gillespie are given credit for 
influencing Stockton to take a hard attitude towards the Californians. 
16Theodore Grivas, Military Governments In California 1846-1850, 
(Glendale, California: The Arthur H. Clark Company, 1936), p. 53. 
16 
Flag Company, into the service as a naval battalion. FrJmont was promoted 
to brevet major and. Gillespie to brevet captain. 17 Sloat had refused to accept 
them because they did not have official orders authorizing their armed activi-
ties. 
Fr~mont and his force of 160 men were embarked on the Cyane, now 
commanded by Commander Samuel Francis DuPont, and taken to San Diego 
for the purpose of attacking General Castro's rear echelons, while Commo-
dore Stockton advanced against his front. Fremont's troops were landed after 
Lieutenant Stephen C. Rowan, USN, in command of a small detachment of 
sailors and Marines, occupied San Diego. Several towns were occupied in 
August, 1846--Santa Barbara, San Pedro, and Los Angeles. 
With the occupation of California all appeared to be quiet in Upper 
California, but the conquest was by no means as complete as Stockton thought. 
Lieutenant Gillespie, with fifty nine men, had been left to occupy Los Angeles. 
His responsibility soon proved more than he could possibly carry out. Since 
most of the population of Los Angeles was Mexican it was here that a rebelUon 
against American occupation began. However successful Gillespie may have 
been as a Marine he did not fare so well as a military commandant. When he 
17 Fr~mont came to California as a Captain in the Topographical Engi-
neers. He resigned his army commission and joined the Bear Flag Revolt. 
He-was later appointed a brevet major in command of a Naval Battalion by 
Commodore Robert F. Stockton. Next he was appointed a brevet lieutenant 
colonel in the Regiment of Mounted Rifles but refused to take orders from 
Brigadier General Stephen Watts Kearny because he was serv:ing under Com-
modore Stockton, Gillespie was a lieutenant in the Marine Corps. He was 
appointed a brevet captain in the California Battalion but is listed in Metcalf's, 
History of the United States Marine Corps as a Lieutenant. He had none of 
the later problems with senior officers such as Fr~mont had. 
17 
arrested several Californians as troublemakers and attempted to deport some 
of them, armed rebels led by Cervula Varela attacked his garrison. This 
rebel force was soon augmented by some three to four hundred Californians 
commanded by Jos~ Maria Flores who had succeeded Castro. A systematic 
siege was conducted and Gillespie was forced to surrender before Stockton 
could send any armed relief other than Lieutenant Henry Watson and twenty 
five men all of whom were captured. On August 29, Gillespie came to terms 
with the Mexicans and the following day he marched his men to San Pedro and 
embarked them aboard the hide ship Vandalia. 18 Captain Gillespie was able 
to arrange excellent capitulation terms with the Mexican commander Jose 
Flores--terms which apparently allowed him to continue to bear arms. 19 
Los Angeles was not the only troubled spot in California. One thou-
sand Walla Walla Indians, or so Stockton was led to believe, had taken to the 
warpath and were threatening Sutter's Fort on the Sacramento River. In re-
sponse to this development, Commodore Stockton sailed to San Francisco 
wher~ word reached him on September 30 concerning Gillespie's embarras,-
sing situation. FrJmont succeeded in calming the Indians, some of whom he 
knew, and settled the trouble thus allowing Stockton to give his attention to 
Gillespie's problem. He immediately sent Captain Mervine and the Savannah 
to San Pedro to support Gillespie, who by this time had been forced to sur-
render. A contributing factor in the Navy's success in California was the use 
18clyde H. Metcalf, f: History of the United States Marine Corps, 
(New York: G. Putnam's Son, 1939), pp. 144-146. 
19Richard H. Collum, History of the United States Marine Corps, 
(Philadelphia: L. R, Hammersly and Company, 1890), p. 83. 
of commercial vessels, when they were needed, by naval officers. The 
captains of the vessels did not hesitate to offer their services--nor did 
they hesitate to file claims, some of,which were· exorbitant, for their 
services rendered. 
As a result of this type of arrangements Stockton immediately 
engaged the services of the merchant ship Sterling: to carry FrJmont 
and 160 men to Santa Barbara with orders to proceed from there to Los 
Angeles. Stockton in the Congress sailed to San Pedro where he would 
begin an advance by land against Los Angeles. En route to San Pedro, 
Stockton received word that Monterey was in serious danger; therefore, 
he put into Monterey, landed an additional force of two officers and fifty 
men, including Marine Lieutenant William A. T. Maddox, a Marine 
detachment, and additional stores, From Monterey he proceeded to 
San Pedro. Stockton left San Francisco on October 15, and arrived at 
San Pedro October 23. There he learned that on October 9, a combined 
naval force, 310 strong, under Captain Mervine and Captain Gillespie 
had attempted unsuccesssfully to reach Los Angeles. They were able to 
move only twelve miles from San Pedro before they were stopped by 
approximately two hundred Californians. 
After a short skirmish the Americans had been forced to 
retreat. The next morning they returned to San Pedro where they re-
embarked on the Savannah. During this brief expedition the advanced 
guard of Marines commanded by Captain Marston was the most valuable 
part of the force. On October 14, Mervine sent two officers and thirty 
five men.from the, Savannah, along with fifteen of Gillespie's volunteers 
under Navy Lieutenant George Minor, aboard the whale ship Magnolia 
18 
19 
to help hold San Diego. 20 
These events emphasized the dual problems of communications and of 
conducting a land campaign from naval vessels. Stockton had received 
Gillespie's message for help on September 30, but he did not arrive until 
October 23rd. Meanwhile Fremont, unable to find sufficient horses for his 
command, had returned to Monterey. On November 15, he finally began his 
march towards Los Angeles. 
The general unrest continued to grow and break out in other quarters. 
A group of Californians, approximately 120 in number, led by Francisco 
Sanchez became quite active in the San Francisco area where they took 
Lieutenant Washington A. Bartlett and five sailors prisoner while they were 
on a supply detail to purchase beef. A short time later, after a brief skir'-
mish, Captain Marston managed to rescue Bartlett and his men and to 
pacify Sanchez. 
About the same time Stockton had sent Lieutenant Minor with the whale 
ship Stoington to Ensonada, about ninety miles below San Diego, for the pur-
pose of procuring horses and beeves which were needed before the march could 
be undertaken to Los Angeles. Perhaps the sharpest criticism offered by 
numerous rancheros, who did not openly oppose the American occupation, 
was they could not protect their cattle from the roving quartermaster depart-
ments of the two opposing forces. Most of December was spent by Commodore 
Stockton in mobilizing, training, and equipping every available man for the 
20Metcalf, ~ History of the United States Marine Corps, pp. 147-148. 
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purpose of retaking and holding Los Angeles and by the last of the month his 
' six hundred man expedition21 was ready to move. During this time of prepar-
ation, Frlmont was moving his forces over the mountains from Monterey, by 
way of San Marcos, to Santa Barbara. 
Before pursuing further the actual conquest of California Stockton 
found it necessary to give attention to an internal development lasting much 
longer than the drama of conquest that gave rise to it. This was a three-way 
struggle for authority between Stockton, Brigadier General Stephen Watts 
Kearny, and Brevet Major, later Brevet Lieutenant Colonel John Charles 
FrJmont. In September the third party in the controversy had appeared in the 
person of General Kearny, who under orders from Washington had marched 
overland from Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, to New Mexico, and on to Warner's 
Ranch in California. As he attempted to move from Warner's Ranch to San 
Diego, Kearny's force became engaged in a bloody fight at San Pascual with 
an armed force of Californians commanded by Andres Pico. In the ensuing 
battle nineteen Americans were killed and fifteen wounded including Kearny 
and Captain Gillespie who, with approximately thirty five men, had been sent 
to aid him. The Californians lost thirty, killed or wounded. Further help 
arrived from Stockton in reply to an urgent message from Kearny, brought 
through the lines by Navy Lieutenant Edward Fitzgerald Beale, Kit Carson, 
and an Indian. The relief expedition of 215 sailors and Marines commanded 
by Navy Lieutenant Andrew F. Gray and Lieutenant Jacob Zeilin, USMC, 
21Dudley W. Knox, ~ History of the United States~. (New York: 
G. P. Putnam's Sons, 1936), p. 173. 
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arrived at Kearny's camp on December 11, 1846. Kearny and the relief forces 
arrived at San Diego the next day where Kearny was received by Stockton. 22 
The struggle which developed for the command of the United States 
· forces in California, as well as the military governorship of the territory, 
was the result of confusion in official c;>rders, the interpretation of those 
orders, personal ambitions and stubbornness, and to some extent professional 
jealousy between the Army and Navy forces in the area. Prior to General 
Kearny's arrival, Stockton had been the recognized authority and had prepared, 
on paper, the civil government he planned to establish; it consisted of a gov-
ernor, a secretary, and a legislative counciL 23 Interestingly, Commodore 
Stockton, although he never received such orders and did not know they existed 
until he saw Kearny had anticipated the views of the United States government 
with respect to civil government in California. 
When Kearny arrived at Stockton's headquarters the Commodore 
offered him the position of commander-in-chief and himself as aid. This 
offer was refused by Kearny as were several subsequent offers of the same 
nature. In fact Kearny insisted that Commodore Stockton remain commander-
in-chief. The first indication of a rift came a short time before the second 
attack on Los Angeles. Kearny indicated\ but not strongly, that he should be 
the governor of the territory. In the second attack on Los Angeles, Kearny 
commanded the assault troops and Stockton was over all commander-in-chief. 
22 Arthur Woodward, "Lances At San Pascual," California Historical 
Society Quarterly, XXVI (March, 1947), pp. 21-62. 
23 . Grivas, Military Governments~ California 1846-..!§QQ, p. 74. 
coordinating Army and Navy forces. On January 13, Kearny recognized 
Stockton as governor of California and the commander of the Uni,ted States 
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· forces. However on January 16, Kearny· in a letter to Stockton demanded that 
the Commodore cease all further proceedings relating to the formation of a 
civil government for California. 24 
It was Fr~mont's misfortune to be caught in the argument between 
these two senior officers and to choese the side which ultimately lost its 
appeal to officials in Washington. Possibly he thought Commodore Stockton 
was the senior officer, or he may have thought his own political connections 
through his father-in-law, Senator Thomas Hart Benson of Missouri, warrant-
. ed his disobeying a superior officer. Later when Commodore W. Branford 
Shubrick became the Pacific Squadron commander, he and Kearny agreed to 
. let the matter rest, however, FrJmont continued to maintain he was military 
governor of California, duly appointed by Stockton, even though he did not 
assume the position until Stockton left Los Angeles on January 19. He acted 
in this capacity for fifty days beginning on January 16, 1847, and ending 
March 7, 1847. 25 Although he carried out his "irregular actions 1126 in the 
name of the United States, Fr~mont's government was never official. 
There· were, however, two sides to the argument. General Kearny 
clearly possessed orders, which neither Fr~mont of Stockton had, to estab-
24 !!§12 !, pp. 1050-1052. 
25Grivas, Military Governments In California 1846-~, p. 97. 
26Bancroft, History <!!' California, V, pp. 465-468. 
lish a civil government. Kearny later stated that he accepted a temporarily 
inferior position for the sake of cooperation and because he lacked troops to 
control the necessary key areas. 
23 
Fre'mont had no legal ground on which to stand when he refused to 
accept General Kearny as his superior officer in California. When he arrived 
at Los Angeles on January 15, 1847, Kearny had sent him a copy of Secretary· 
of War William L. Marcy's orders of June 18, 1846, which were addressed to 
Kearny and clearly stated that ". . . these troops, and such as may be organ-
ized in Upper California, will be under your command. 1127 I If Fremont had 
accepted these orders he would not have been arrested by Kearny and ulti-
mately court martialed. 28 On March 28, General Kearny sent Colonel Richard 
Barnes Mason, who had been sent as his eventual replacement, to Los Angeles 
to be both military and civil governor. This brought on the clash with 
Fremont, which resulted in a challenge. Although the date for the duel was 
not set, Colonel Mason did select the weapons--double barreled shotgu~s. 29 
The controversy over chain of command did not keep Commodore· 
Stockton and General Kearny from pressing their expedition against Los 
Angeles. Approximately three weeks passed after Kearny's arrival at 
27House Executive Document 31, 30th Congress, 2nd session. Serial 
573, p. 240. -
28senate Executive Document 33, 30th Congress, 1st session. Serial 
507, pp. 1-446. This document contains the complete records of Fremont's 
court martial trial. 
29Grivas, Military Governments ~ California lli&,-1&&.Q., p. 77. 
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Stockton's camp, before thejr combined forces met and defeated a California 
force of eight hundred men commanded by JosJ Flores. The two armies met, 
January 8, at San Gabriel River, and on January 9, at Mesa. The Americans 
· were victorious in both battles. As Flores retreated towards Pasadena; the 
Stockton-Kearny column found the road open to Los Angeles, which they 
entered on January 10, 1847, and Captain Gillespie once again raised the 
American flag which he. had been forced to lower the previous September. 
A short time later Fr~mont and his ragged, weary, miserably clad 
host encountered the Californians at Rancho Cahuenga near San Fernando. 
Flores, realizing that he could not negotiate with Stockton, had turned over 
his command to Andres Pico who met FrJmont January 13, and signed the 
Capitulation of Cahuenga which brought to a close the war in Upper Cali-
fornia. 3° Commodore Stockton as commander-in-chief was disturbed at 
Fremont's presumptive act of negotiating a treaty without the presence of a 
senior officer. What Fremont's motives were is unknown. Possibly he 
anticipated being appointed governor and wanted to prove his friendship to 
the Californians. Whatever the reason Stockton accepted the capitulation and 
included a copy of it in his dispatch to Secretary of Navy George Bancroft. 31 
On January 22, 1847, Commodore W, Branford Shubrick arrived in 
California and assumed command of the Pacific Squadron. Commodore 
30wnliam H. Ellison, "San Juan to Cahuenga: The Experiences of 
Fremont's Battalion," Pacific Historical Review, XXVII (August, 1958), 
pp. 260-261. 
31Grivas, Military Governments ~ California 1846-1850, p. 63. 
Stockton joined a party of hunters, and crossing the Rocky Mountains, 
returned overland to the United States. Shortly after the second 
occupation of Los Angeles army units, namely the Mormon Battalion, 
commanded by Lieutenant Colonel Philip St. George Cooke, and the 
New York Volijnteers under Colonel Jonathan Drake Stevenson, 
arrived the last of March and the first of April. The last of May 
General Kearny, who had been military governor from February 9, 
1847 until May 31, 1847, turned the government of California over to 
Colonel Mason and returned to St. Louis. Thus ended the first phase 
of the naval operations on the West Coast. 
Commodore James Biddle, the senior American naval officer 
in the Pacific area, arrived off California March 2, 1847, and re-
mained until July, 1847. During this time he assumed overall command 
but did not interfere with Commodore Shubrick and the Northern 
Pacific Squadron which was preparing to enter the second phase of 
operations against Lower California and the West Coast of Mexico. 
He did assert his authority by calling back to ship duty all naval 
officers and men assigned to shore duty. Also he ordered the 
American ships blockading the port of Guaymas to allow the resumption 
of trade in that area. 
Commodore Shubrick's first official action was to take charge 
of the fleet which at that time consisted of the razee Independence 56, 
Copgress 60, Portsmouth 24, Cyane 24, Preble 16, Dale 16, Warren 
24, and two supply ships, the·~ and the Southampton. Shubrick's 
next move was to strike a blow at Mazatlin, Mexico, as it was the most 
important commercial port on the Mexican West Coast. His plan was 
25 
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to gain control of the custom-house, declare a tariff32 as he had been directed 
by the new Secretary of Navy John Y, Mason, and collect revenue from such 
to help defray the expenses of the squadron. This operation was delayed, 
however, until September, 1847, for two reasons: first, to give the crews 
a chance to rest; and second, because weather conditions along the West 
Coast of Mexico in the late spring and summer months made it virtually 
impossible for sailing vessels to operate, let alone engage in landing 
operations. Meanwhile operations were carried out against Baja, 
California, which had been left out of the treaty negotiations with Upper 
California. In March, 1847, while Shubrick was preparing to move his 
naval forces to the West Coast of Mexico, Commodore Biddle sent Comman-
der John Berrien Montgomery in the Portsmouth to occupy San Jose, located 
near the tip of Baja, California. The landing force consisted of 140 men 
who met no resistance of any kind. At 10:00 a. m.; March 30, 1847, the 
Mexican flag was lowered and the American flag raised in its place, Caho 
San Lucas, at the very tip of the Baja peninsula, was occupied in the same 
manner. La Paz, on the East Coast, was occupied without resistance 
April 14, by ninety Marines and sailors under Navy Lieutenant John S. 
Missroon. A humorous incident occurred as a result of the occupation of 
La Paz, Commander Montgomery reported to Commodore Biddle they 
had confiscated $11,950, 00 worth of cigars. No mention was made of 
32 @12_ !, p. 1073. 
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their disposition. 33 These three ports were easily taken, however, as the 
· Navy was soon to learn, the occupying forces would.have their troubles. 
Commodore Shubrick now shifted his operation to the mainland and 
attempted to blockade several ports at the same time. He soon realized he 
did not have sufficient ships to accomplish this and that the reduction of 
these ports could be accomplished only by landing parties of sufficient 
strength to seize and hold them. As it was the season of bad weather he sent 
all ships, except the Cyane and the Independence which were left to blockade 
Mazatlan, north to Monterey and San Francisco where the. months until· 
October were spent :i.n intensive training for landing operations. During this 
period of training the various ships of the squadron took turns in blockading 
Mazatlan. Early in August, Commodore Shubrick sent the Congress, the 
Portsmouth, and the ~ south to enforce as strict a blockade as possible 
on the principal Mexican ports which included Mazatlan, Guaymas and San 
Blas. 34 When Commodore Shubrick was ready to commence operations 
again Colonel Mason replaced the old muskets and carbines used by the 
~ailor companies with fine army muskets and other accoutrements. 35 
Shubrick' s plan, as reported to Secretary Mason, was to blockade 
the minor ports and occupy the major ones with landing parties. Accordingly, 
33Ibid. , p. 1057. 
34Metcalf, !: History of the United States Marine Corps. pp. 156-157. 
35samuel F. DuPont, "The War With Mex:i.co: The Cruise of the U. S. 
Ship Cyane During the Years 1845-48." United States Naval Institute Pro-
ceedings, VIII, No. 3, (December, 1882), p. 42~ - -
28 
on September 30, 1847, the Dale, under Commander Thomas 0. Selfridge 
approached the harbor of Muleje', running under English colors in order to 
deceive the Mexicans; after an appropriate lapse of time Selfridge hauled 
down the English flag and ran up the American colors. Lieutenant Tunis 
Augustus McDonahue Craven was sent ashore under a white flag of truce to 
obtain information concerning the inhabitants of the town. He was net by a 
Mexican who informed him the town was in the possession of Mexican forces 
who were not disposed to accept American jurisdiction and further they would 
fire upon the Americans if they attempted to land. The next day, following a 
brief skirmish, the enemy were driven from the town by the sailors and 
Marines from the Dale. The Mexican schooner Magdalen, owned by Jesus 
Mandana of Guaymas was seized, stripped of all valuable equipment, and 
burned at sea. Not having sufficient strength to maintain a permanent 
garrison at MulejJ, Commander Selfridge chartered the schooner Liberty of 
Loreto, for seven dollars a day, and placed Lieutenant Craven in command 
of her with orders to help maintain a blockade in the Gulf of California. 36 
At the time of pacification of these smaller ports was taking place a 
much larger operation was underway against the important port of Guaymas. 
The Congress, commanded by Captain E. A. F. Lavallette, the Portsmouth 
under Commander J. B. Montgomery, and the Independence, Lieutenant 
Richard Le Page in command were sent to occupy the port and arrived there 
on October 17. The same day they arrived the landing forces set up heavy 
36 HED !, p, 1100. 
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mortars on two small islands in the harbor. It was known that the sentiment 
of the town was anti,-American because a year earlier, when the Cyane was 
sent to blockade the port, United States Consul John A. Robinson had report-
ed that all American citizens had been ordered to move twenty leagues into 
the interior. 37 This was a precaution taken a number of times on the 
Frontier by Spanish authorities dealing with Anglo-Americans. The next day 
the Mexicans were given an opportunity to surrender. The Mexican comman-
der delayed giving an answer and that night the forces defending the town 
retreated to another position some three miles distant where they had a 
battery of fourteen guns placed in order to resist the Americans should they 
attempt to penetrate the interior. The next morning, October 20, at 6:00 
a. m. the vessels opened fire on the town. The two mortars on the islands 
took part in the bombardment which amol.lnted to sonie five hundred rounds. 
Only one person, an Englishman, was killed and only minor damage occur-
red to the town. The citizens gladly surrendered, and a party of Marines 
under Lieutenant Henry Watson went ashore and raised the American flag. 
Before he left the port Commander Montgomery had all the small arms and 
ammunition collected and placed on board the Portsmouth. 
On November 17, 1847, Commander Selfridge, from the Dale, was 
forced to land sixty five Marines and sailors in order to retake Guaymas 
from approximately 350 local Mexican f9rces. The supporting fire from the 
37united States Department of State. Dispatches From the g. §• 
Consuls !!?- Guaymas, Mexico, ~-1$98. Micro-copy T-210, roll 1, 
October 10, 1846. 
· Dale was the decisive factor in driving the Mexicans out of the town. On -
December 30, Lieutenant Craven., with fifty sailors and a detachment of 
Marines captured the village of Cochori.. The situation there remained un.-
settled throughout January and February and up to,March 15, 1848, when 
Lieutenant Robert Tansell, who commanded the Marine detachment on the 
Dale had to again drive the enemy from the town. Thereafter the Marines - ' 
maintained a garrison in Cochori until June 24, 1848, when news was 
30 
· received that peace had been established by the Treaty of Guadalu.pe Hidalgo. 
The important naval operation on the West Coast of Mexico was 
the occupation of Mazatl!n wh~se excellent port and town were garrisoned 
by approximately 1, 200· Mexican troops under Colonel Rafael Telles. 
Commodore Shubrick, commanding the Congress, Independence, and the 
Cyane arrived off Mazatl~n on November 10, 1847. He stationed his ships, 
after dark, so that the fort could be brought under fire simultaneously 
from three sides. Early on the morning of November 11, Captain 
Lavellett went ashore with a surrender message from Commodore Shubrick 
to Colonel Telles: no definite answer was given by the military commander, 
however, the civil authorities wanted to surrender. At twelve noon Commo-
dore Shubrick gave the order for the force of 750 to commence landing. 
The· five artillery pieces and the boats of the Congress were commanded by 
Lieutenant J. W. Livingston, the boats of the Independence were under 
Lieutenant Le Page while the immediate commander of the landing party 
was Captain Lavallett. The city was occupied without resistance. Mazatl,n 
is remembered as the·most precise naval operation of the Pacific Squadron 
during the· Me~ican War. Soon after the occupation of Mazatlkn news was 
31 
received of the capture of Mexico City. 38 
Perhaps the greatest humiliation to the Mexican government, resulting 
from the Pacific operation, was the occupation of historic San Blas Naval 
Yard and Port, Established May 16, 1768, by Visitador Jos, de Galvez, the 
Department of San Blas had remained for more than fifty years an important 
outlet for Mexico's interior trade with the West Coast. 39 The United States 
Navy had first visited San Blas, so far as the Mexican War was concerned, in 
September, 1846, when the Cyane, under Commander DuPont sailed into the 
harbor and DuPont sent Lieutenant Stephen C. Rowan, his executive officer, 
and a detachment of men on shore to spike the twenty four guns defending the 
harbor. 40 The second and final occupation occurred January 12, 1848, under 
the command of Lieutenant-Commandant Theodorous Bailey and a landing 
party from the supply ship Lexington, who occupied the port without resistance. 
La Paz, which had b.een initially taken in April, 1847, by a combined 
naval force commanded by Lieutenant Missroon was soon o?cupied by two 
companies of New York Volunteers commanded by Lieutenant Colonel Henry 
S. Burton, whose over all mission was to control Lower California. This 
proved to be a much harder task than had been anticipated as enemy activities 
38DuPont, "The War With Mexico, " pp. 428-429. 
39Michael E. Thurman, "The Establishment of the Department of San 
Blas Its Initial Fleets: 1767-1770," Hispanic American: Historical Review, 
XLIII (February, 1963), p. 68. 
40Edgar Stanton Maclay, ~ History _2! the United~· Navy From 1775 
. to 1893. (3 vols., New York: D. Appleton and Company, 1893), II, p. 88, --
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could be readily supported by Mexican forces across the gulf. It was the 
opinion of Colonel Burton and Commodore Shubrick that five hundred to a 
thousand men were needed to control the inhabitants of Lower California in-
stead of the 110 men which Burton had. As a result he was, of necessity, 
confined to the town itself. 41 Nor were their fears without considerable justi-
fication since during the month of November Manuel Peneda led an insurrection 
against Burton's force at La Paz. Several times during the month they attack-
ed but were repulsed by the New York Volunteers. Burton's force was 
strengthened by the arrival of the Cyane and its Marine detachment which re-
mained until February, 1848, when 150 troops commanded by Colonel Mason, 
arrived from Upper California. 
Approximately the same time that La Paz was being attacked Marine 
Lieutenant Charles Heywood, who had been left at San Jos~ with forty five 
Marines and sailors and twenty civilian volunteers, 42 came under seige by a 
force of 150 Mexicans. The enemy force, for the most part, consisted of 
tough Yaqui Indians whose fighting prowess was known to the Spanish Conquis-
tadors. This action occurred November 19, 1847. Heywood was harrassed 
from that time until he was relievedon'April 30, 1848, making this the longest 
battle engaged in by the Pacific Squadron. He had been reinforced several 
times for a few days and each time the enemy would withdraw until the 
reinforcements left. During this period the Cyane, Portsmouth, and the 
41 
RED .!, p. 1084. 
42Maclay, ~ History 2f_ the United States~~ 1775 ~ 1889, II, 
pp. 95-96. 
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Southampton all visited the port. 
From the time the Southampton left San Jos~ and the Cyane arrived on 
February 14, 1848, the Mexican forces had increased to an estimated three 
or four hµ;ndred men and thus by February 10, the Marines were in a desperate 
situation. When the Cyane finally arrived they had been under close siege for 
more than a week and the enemy controlled all the town except the mission 
which Heywood occupied. On February 12, the Marines were cut off from their 
water supply located in the immediate vicinity of the mission. The afternoon 
of the fourteenth the Cyane came in sight but was unable to land reinforcements 
until the following morning, when Commander DuPont landed with 102 men and 
officers. With the supporting fire of the Cyane's twenty four guns the landing 
party fought its way toward the mission; as they approached Heywood with his 
Marines sallied forth and helped drive off the enemy. The Mexicans were 
routed and thus ended the long series of sieges to which the American garrison 
had been subjected. 43 The battle of La Paz and San JosJ continued after the 
Treaty of Peace, between the United States and Mexico, had been signed on 
February 2, 1848. Soon after the siege at San Jose had been lifted Padre 
Gabriel, the chief troublemaker in Lower California, surrendered to Commo-
, 44 
dore DuPont at Mazatlan. . 
After the cessation of hostilities until May, 1848, the Pacific Squadron 
maintained a hold on Mazatl~n and Guaymas, and blockaded San Blas. On 
43Metcalf, ~ History of the United States Marine Corps, pp. 160-161. 
44 
. HED !, p. 1151. 
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May 7, 1848, the cycle of naval command and the further humilitation of the 
· Mexican government were completed when Captain Thomas ap. C. Jones, in 
the 70-gun ship-of-the-line Ohio, once again assumed command of the Pacific 
Squadron. 
Government documents, personal memoirs, naval records, eye witness 
accounts, and secondary sources prove that the conquest, occupation, and 
governing of California by American military forces from July, 1846, through 
December, 1849, 45 was indeed a pre-determined goal46 of the United States 
government carried out, for the most part by the Pacific Squadron of the 
United States Navy and its military arm, The United States Marine Corps. In 
a war both land and sea, hindered by operational blunders, disregard of orders, 
shortage of military personnel, equipment and experience, the Pacific 
Squadron as a unit accomplished a remarkable feat. At times out of communi-
cation with its government, forced to forage for supplies, and to conduct a 
war for which it was not trained, it none the less accomplished its goals --
the reduction of Upper and Lower California and a satisfactory blockade of the 
West Coast of Mexico. There was no lack of valor on the part of individuals 
and detachments whether Marines or sailors. Military feats, such as 
Lieutenant Charles Heywood's stand at San Jose reflect the traditions of the 
45Grivas, Military Governments IE California 1846-1850, p. 79. 
46Robert G. Cleland, "Early Sentiment for Annexation of California, 
An Account of the Growth of American Interest In California From 1835 to 
1846, 11 The Southwestern Historical Quarterly, 
In three parts. Part I (July, 1914 to April, 1915), pp. 1-40; Part II (October, 
1914), pp. 121-161; Part III (January, 1915), pp. 231-260. This article is an 
excellent discussion of the problem. 
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Marine Corps even at that early date. Commodore Shubrick in his official 
report of February 21, 1848, to the Honorable JohnY. Mason Secretary of the 
Navy, emphasized the importance of the Corps and recommended that it be 
increased in size. 47 The problem of coordinating military movements from 
sailing vessels was without question a frustrating experience, and to adhere 
to a strict schedule was almost impossible. More than once a ship was be-
calmed and arrived too late to be of help in a landing operation. 
The Mexican forces· in California, and in the Mexican West Coast 
ports, were inadequately prepared in arms or by nature to offer any l:;>ut token 
resistance,. in most cases, against the over extended American forces. From 
their actions it would appear that they were more interested in saving their 
''honor" than in seriously challenging the military forces of the United States. 
Approximately twelve major towns and ports were occupied by the 
Squ~ron. A total of forty enemy ships, 48 for the most part small coastal 
vessels, were either destroyed or confiscated. The number of Americans 
· killed or wounded were relatively small compared to the size and importance 
of the prize gained. At no time were there· more than ten ships involved. In 
the era of Manifest Destiny it was a welcome accomplishment. 
47 HED .!,, p. 1132. 
48Robert Wilden Neeser, Statistical and Chronological History of the 
United States Navy, 1775-1.!!Q.1. (2 vols,, New York: The Macmillan Company, 
1909), II, pp. 312-316. 
CHAPTER III 
THE HOME SQUADRON 
The naval operations of the Home Squadron1 in the Gulf of Mexico is 
largely the story of two officers--Commodore David Conner and his successor 
in command, Commodore Matthew C. Perry! Considerable controversy de-
veloped among the early historians of the Mexican War, several of whom were 
either Naval or Army officers, as to the reason Conner was replaced by Perry 
during the Navy's greatest achievement in the war on the East Coast--the 
battle of Vera Cruz. Some implied that Conner was removed for having failed 
to carry out his orders and because he had in some way displeased the Navy 
2 Department. 
Normally a commodore was given the command of a 1;:1quadron for a 
period of three years and he retained it for that period unless sickness, death, 
or some other emergency removed him. If for unsatisfactory service he was 
removed, he was said to have been "superseded"; if his term of service was 
satisfactory he was "relieved". When the war with Mexico began in May, 
1Phiiip Syang Physick Conner,· The Home Squadron Under Commodore 
Conner In the War With Mexico, (Philadelphia, l,896), p. 50 fn 2. The Home 
Squadron was originally intended as a school for seamen. 
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1846, Conner already was due to be relieved. However, Secretary of the Navy 
James Y •. Mason asked Commodore Conner to continue in command. 3· 
When Perry took over the command of the Home Squadron on March 21, 
\ 
1847, just as the battle for Vera Cruz was beginning, it came as no surprise 
to either man. It had been understood from the beginning that Perry would 
assume command. That it took so long, almost a year, to transfer the com-
mand from Conner to Perry was due, in part, to the general unpreparedness 
of the United States government, a situation which effectively hindered the 
Army and Navy in their prosecution of the war. Conner commendably was 
willing to resign his command at a most crucial hour in his career. 
As a result of the general state of unpreparedness at the outbreak of 
war, the Navy did not enjoy great popularity and found it hard to secure re-
cruits, a fact which was not overlooked by foreign newspapers. The London 
Times reported, "The United States government has authorized recruiting 
officers to offer a bounty of $20. 00 and three months advanced wages to all 
able bodied men who will re-enter the service. New rec.ruits are offered 
$15. 00 bounty and three months advanced wages. 114 Discipline in the years 
from 1812 to 1846 was poor. Control of naval matters had fallen into the 
hands of shrewd officers who were interested in themselves and their friends. 
In some cases those who drew the most pay rendered the least service. The 
3Ibid. , p. 5. John Y. Mason was Secretary of Navy March, 1844 
through March, 1845; George Bancroft was Secretary from March, 1845 through 
September, 1846: John Y. Mason from September, 184;6 through March, 1849. 
4London Times, June 29, 1846, page 5, column 3. Quoted from the 
Baltimore Patriot. 
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top echelon of officers in the Marine Corps was in a similar condition. Ma-
rine officers usually refused to cruise after being promoted to a field grade 
rank and one Marine officer had been in the Corps for a long period of time 
without ever going to sea. 5 This situation developed because of conditions 
which existed after the war of 1812: there was little opportunity, or need, for 
promotion or increased efficiency within either the Navy or the Marine Corps 
after that conflict ended. 
The chain of command, from the Navy Department to the squadrons did 
not function properly. This was due generally to the poor communications 
system and the fact that an entire squadron could be out of contact with 
Washington for several months at a time. Thus, for all practical purposes, 
the naval war in the Gulf and along the East Coast of Mexico was conducted 
separate from the naval operations of the Pacific Squadron. If there was any 
coordination of plans it was to be found in the blockading of Mexican ports 
and this was probably accidental. The Home Squadron was plagued with many 
of the same problems as those faced by the Pacific Squadron -- inadequate 
equipment, poor communications, a; shortage of supplies, and \ong supply 
lines. One advantage the :a_ome Squadron had over the Pacific Squadron was 
the number of different ships available, at one time or another, during the war. 
Type of Ship 
Steamers 
Spitfire 
Size of puns 
8-inch (63-pounder) 
32-pounders 
Number of Guns 
1 
2 
5 Justin H. Smith, The War With Mexico, (2 vols., New York: The 
Macmillan Company, 1919'f,'r1;--p: 19p. 
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Type of Ship (Continued) Size of Guns Number of Guns 
. Vixen 24-pounders 3 
Petrita* 32-pounders 1 
Mississippi** 10-inch (85-pounder) 2 
8-inch 8 
Princeton** 8-inch 1 
42-pounders 8 
Scourage 32-pounders 1 
24-pounders 2 
Scorpion 8-inch 2 
18-pounders 2 
Frigates 
Potomac** · 32-pounders 24 
42-pounders 20 
Cumberland** 32-pounders 24 
42-pounders 20 
Raritan** 8-inch 8 
-32-pounders 42 
Sloops of War 
John Adams** 8-inch 4 
32-poi.mders 16 
St. Mary's** 32-pounders 24 
Falmouth** 24-pounders 24 
Albany 8-inch 4 
32-pounders 18 
Decatur 32-pounders 14 
Germantown 32-pounders 18 
8-pounders 2 
Schooner 
Flirt 18-pounders 2 
Brigs 
Perry 32-pounders 6 
Lawerence 12-pounders 2 
32-pounders 18 
Somers** 32-pounders 10 
Washington 18-pounders 1 
32-pounders 2 
Porpoise 9-pounder 8 
24-pounders 8 
Gtm"B:oats 
Bonita* 32-pounder 1 
Reefer* 32-pounder 1 
Petrel* 32-pounder 1 
Falcon 32-pounder 1 
Tampico 32-pounder 1 
Mahonese* 32-pounder 1 
Nonata* 42-pounders 4 

















Pensacola, Florida, the closest supply depot, was nine hundred miles 
away from the scene of action. It took a sailing vessel a month or more to 
make a round trip from Vera Cruz to Pensacola •. Even at Pensacola critical 
supplies, such as fresh water for the crews and coal for the steamers, were 
by no means assured whenever a ship arrived. Conner's operations in the 
early part of the war were greatly hindered by this inadequate system of sup-
ply. Attacks and blockades on Mexican ports in June and July of 1846 were 
impossible because gun-boats promised him did not arrived until July 28, and 
the small schooners, so badly needed for river operations, did not arrive 
until fall when for the lack of fuel they were useless. It was not until August, 
1846, that the first storeship arrived, and its supplies consisted mainly of 
water. On October 6, the first shipment of coal reached Conner's squadron 
7 off Vera Cruz. 
In addition the Home Squadron had to ,contend with the vicious winter 
6Robert Wilden Neeser, The Statistical ~ Chronological History of 
the ~ States Navy 1775-~, (2 vols., New York: The Macmillan Com-
pany, 1909), II, pp. 64-72. 
*captured Mexican vessels placed in service by the Home Squadron. 
**The Home Squadron as of May 13, 1848, when the Treaty of Guadalupe 
Hidalgo was signed. 
7 Conner, The Home Squadron, p. 10. 
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gales of the Gulf, known as "northers". The East Coast of Mexico was well 
protected in the winter by these fierce storms which came up unexpectedly and 
blew for as long as seventy two hours without a break. 8 During one twenty four 
hour period off Vera Cruz, twenty three merchant ships were blown ashore, 
several small boats were destroyed, and the steam frigate Mississippi parted 
her anchor cable. 9 Disease, principally yellow fever, was the great protector 
of Mexicans along the coast during the summer months. As a result of these 
two problems time became a very important factor in naval operations on the 
Mexican East Coast. Because of the time element involved and the difficulty 
of keeping the events of wa:r straight, a brief chronological account of naval 
operations on the East Coast is necessary. The calendar of naval operations 
was as follows: 
May 8, 1846, Point Isabel. 
May 18, 1846, Barrita, Mexico. 
June 8-15, the first expedition to Tampico. 
August 7, the first attack on Alvarado, 
October 15, the second attack on Alvarado. 
October 16 through November 1, first expedition to Frontera and Tobasco. 
November 10 through December 13, the second expedition to Tampico. 
November 14-15, the Panuco River expedition. 
8Raphael Semmes, U. S. N., Service Afloat and Ashore During~ 
Mexican War,(Cincinnati: Wm H. Moore & Co,, Publishers, 1851), pp .. 109-111. 
9Dudley w. Knox, ~ History 2f the United States Navy, (New York: 
G. P. Putnam's Sons, 1936), p. 169. 
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December 17-27, the first expedition to Laguna de los Terminos, Yucatan. 
January, February, and March, 1847, blockade duty and preparation for Vera 
Cruz landing. 
March 9-29, 1847, Vera Cruz. Marine detachments sent with Scott's army to 
Mexico City. 
April 1-4, the third and final expedition against Alvarado. 
April 18, occupation of Tuspan. 
May 18, the second visit to Laguna de los Terminos, 
June 16-24, the second expedition to Tobasco and an expedition to Campeche, 
Yucatan. 
June 30, the occupation of Tamultay. 
July, 1847 through July 26, 1848, the occupation of ports captured and the 
continued blockade of the East Coast ports. The completion of naval 
activities in the Mexican War. 
'l'he Home Squadron, commanded by Conner, was ready when General 
Mariano Arista's forces attacked Captain S~ B. Thorton's dragoon patrol 
) 
April 24, 1846. The squadron began its active engagement in the war by sup-
porting General Zachary Taylor's advance to the Rio Grande. While Taylor 
was defeating the Mexicans at Palo Alto and Resaca de la Palma, a landing 
force of five hundred Marines and sailors, commanded l:;>y Naval Captain F. H. 
Gregory, was sent to protect Fort Polk, located at Point Isabel, which was 
Taylor's supply depot. The men for this land!ng force were taken primarily 
from the Cumberland, Raritan, Potomac, and the John Adams. The Marine 
Battalion, commanded by Lieutenant William Lang, was assigned to the center 
of the enclosure as its defensive position. The sailors from the Raritan and 
the Potomac defended the rest of the same side of the fort which faced the 
enemy. The naval landing party remained until May 13, when it returned to 
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the fleet. lO 
On May 18, a detachment of two hundred seamen and Marines from the 
Cumberland and the Potomac, under the command of Captain John H~ Aulick, 
USN, proceeded up the Rio Grande to the Mexican town of Barri ta, lpcated on 
the right bank of the river; as the army did not cross over from the left bank 
until after noon, the honor of unfµrling the American flag on Mexican soil went 
to the Navy. 11 The naval party remained in Barri ta for two days before re-
turning to Fort Polk. The next naval activity did not take place until June 8, 
1846. The somewhat long periods of time between operations of the Navy, at 
various times during the war, were not due to any hesitancy on the part of the 
naval forces engaged, but rather to the obstacles mentioned earlier. 
At the same time these initial co-operative engagements with the Army 
were taking place. Commodore Conner was attempting to carry out the two 
major orders that had been given him by the Secretary of the Navy -- blockading 
the Mexican East Coast ports and waging war on privateers. 12 The blockade 
was, at first, ineffectual because of the shortage of ships, especially the small-
er steamers which were later used to such good advantage in the river opera-
tions. A partial blockade of the East Coast ports was maintained. The hope 
10clyde H. Metcalf, !: History of the United States Marine Corps, (New 
York: G. P. Putnam's Sons, 1939), pp. 110-.113. 
11House Executive Document 1, 30th Congress, 2nd session. Serial 
537, pp. 1163-1164. Herein after cited as HED !, 
12House Executive Document 4, 29th Congress, 2nd session, Serial 497, 
pp. 40-42. Herin after cited as HED-i_. 
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apparently was to encourage foreign trade to continue, for with the American 
occupation of these ports revenue would be forthcoming for the expenses of the 
squadron. 
One other incident should be mentioned with respect to the blockade. In 
late June or early July, 1846, Commander Alexander Slidell McKenzie was dis-
. patched to Cuba on a secret mission; he was to arrange for the return of 
Antonio Lopez de Santa Anna to Mexico -- with the blessing of the United States 
government -- the vain hope that he would co-operate in bringing the war to a 
close. Accordingly, in August, the Steamer Arab was allowed to run the 
blockade and land Santa Anna and his suite at Vera Cruz. 13 The appearance of 
Santa Anna off Vera Cruz was no surprise to Conner. On May 13, 1846, George 
Bancroft, who was then Secretary of the Navy, had sent Conner a confidential 
dispatch which read: "Commodore, if Santa Anna endeavors to enter the 
Mexican ports, you will allow him to pass freely .1114 Santa Anna had not 
changed; for no sooner was he safely back on Mexican soil than he was again 
anti-American. His egotism, however, worked favorably for the United States 
and made him, in the end, an effective instrument for ending the war. 
On June 8, 1846, Commodore Conner began his first major operation 
against the Mexican ports with a preliminary expedition to Tampico. This was 
carried out by the sloop St. Mary's, commanded by Commander, J. L. 
Saunders. The fort was shelled until the Mexican defenders were forced to 
13Ibid., pp. 117-120. 
14House Executive Document 50, 30th Congress, 1st session, Vol, 7, 
Serial 520, p. 774. Herein after cited as !:illQ .Q.Q.. 
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withdraw temporarily. An attempt to cut out, or to board, the Mexican vessels 
lying in the Panuco River was unsuccessful because the current was too strong 
to row agalnst. Not until November 10, was Conner able to mount a second 
attempt to occupy Tampico. 
Commodore Conner's next move, on August 7, was an unsuccessful 
assault on the important port of Alvarado, which lay about thirty miles south-
east of the fleet anchorage at AntJn Lizardo, off Vera Cruz. Alvarado had 
proven difficult to blockade because of the wide bar covering its approaches. 
On the first attempt Conner had no steamers of sufficiently light draught to 
cross the bar and tow the gun-boats. Nevertheless Conner attempted to carry 
out his orders. The Mississippi and the Princeton bombarded the defenses of 
Alvarado for about six hours with little success. While the two steamers were 
engaging the Mexican fort, which was unable to reply because of its light guns, 
a landing party of Marines and sailors attempted to row, unsuccessfully, up-
stream and attack the fort. Failing in this, because recent rains had so 
swollen the river, they returned to their ships. The failure to take Alvarado 
was especially embarrassing as the unfortunate affair had been witnessed by 
British naval ships. In addition, the weather turned bad, forcing Conner to 
retire with his force to Antbn Lizardo. 15 
The Home Squadron, in the Gulf of Mexico, was at a disadvantage in 
that it was in closer contact with Washington, D. c. than was the Pacific 
Squadron. In September, Conner was notified by the Navy Bureau that the 
15Metcalf, United States Marine Corps, p. 113. 
administration wanted something done for the newspapers to make a "noise 
aboq.t". 16 Accordingly, Conn~r made plans to renew his attack on Alvarado. 
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A second attempt to take Alvarado was made on October 15, 1846. The 
defenses of Alvarado consisted of eleven artillery pieces, two brigs of nine guns 
each, a schooner with seven guns, two gunboats each mounting a long 24-
pounder, and approximately one thousand men. To combat these defenses 
Conner had two steamers and five gunboats mounting a total of fourteen guns 
and from four to five hundred men for his assault force. Commodore Conner 
led the attack with one steamer towing two gunboats. This part of the flotilla 
managed to cross the bar and engage the Alvarado batteries. Further progress 
· 17 
was stopped when the second wave of the assault grounded on the bar. A 
landing party led by Captain French Forrest, commander of the Mississippi, 
was forced to retire when it became evident that Conner's force, the Vixen and 
two gunboats, were ineffective against the defenses of Alvarado. Conner 
apparently had not given any consideration to landing a strong naval party west 
of the town and attacking by land. This tactic was later used successfully by 
18 Perry. 
On October 16, immediately following the second attempt to take 
Alvarado, Conner sent Commodore Perry with a force of eight vessels and two 
16smith, The~ With Mexico, II, p. 196. 
17 Conner, The Home Squadron, pp. 7-8. 
18Metcalf, United States Marine Corps, p. 114. P. S. P~ Conner 
blames the failure to take Alvardo on Washington claiming that Commodore Con-
ner did not have the proper forces and equipment for the attack. Conner, p. 17. 
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hundred extra Marines and sailors from the fleet on an expedition to take 
Frontera, located at the mouth of the Tobasco River in the state of Tobasco. 
This was an important move because Frontera was a source for cattle. Also, 
a considerable amount of supplies were thought to be eluding the blockade 
through this p0rt. Perry's orders were to capture any enemy vessels found on 
the river and then to move upriver seventy-two miles against San Juan 
Bautista de Tobasco, the capitol of the state of Tobasco and an important 
trading center. 
The Marines were organized into a special squadron under the command 
of Marine Captain Alvin Edson of the Raritan, 19 When Perry arrived off the 
bar at the mouth of the Tobasco River, he transferred to the light steamer 
. Vixen, which had the Bonita and Forward in tow, and, followed by a landing 
party in barges, pushed across the bar and tookthe Mexican vessels by sur-
prise. The Mexican schooner Petrita was captured, along with a hot meal 
left by the crew, and was immediately placed in service as a tow vessel. 
In order to keep the enemy from gaining valuable time, Perry left a 
small force to hold Frontera while the remainder of the task force headed up-
stream towards San Juan Bautista. The next two days, October 24 and 25, 
were spent in moving upstream. The·~ and the Petrita towed the other 
vessels. At Devil's Turn, a few miles below Tobasco it was necessary to land 
a detachment and capture a breastwork containing .four long 24-pounders. At 
three o'clock in the afternoon of the 25th the expedition arrived at San Juan 
19Richard H. Collum, History of the United States Marin~ Corps 
(Philadelphia: L. R. Hammersly and Co. , 1890), p. 89. 
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Bautista and after a very brief bombardment the Mexicans asked for hostilities 
to cease until they could negotiate a surrender. 20 
When the Americans landed they were immediately brought under fire 
by Mexican troops concealed in the chaparral. The landing force held its 
ground until nightfall when they returned to their ships. Early the next morning 
the Mexicans opened fire on the shtps but were silenced by a few bursts of 
grape and cannister. Soon after this exchange of gunfire, several citizens came 
on board the Vixen and informed Perry that the town would like to surrender. 21 
As the flotilla was preparing to leave, Lieutenant William A. Parker and 
eighteen men, on board a captured boat, were attacked. Lieutenant Charles 
W. Morris, who was sent to reinforce him, and one other man were killed. 
Realizing he did not have sufficient men to occupy San Juan Bautista, Perry 
returned downstream to Frontera where the McLane and the Forward were 
left to maintain a blockade. Perry and the rest of the expedition then returned 
to Anton Lizardo. 22 
Commodore Perry next succeeded in capturing four schooners, two 
steamers, and one brig, all of which were used by the American Navy for 
blockading the river ports. Two American merchant brigs -- the Coosa and 
20Edgar Stanton Maclay, !!- History of ~ United States Navy From 
1775 to 1898 (3 vols., New York: D. Appleton and Company, 1893), II, 
p. 1or.--
21Ibid., p. 103. 
22 
~ !., p. 1167. 
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the Plymouth-- were found in communication with the enemy, were confiscated, 
and pressed into service. Also, four smaller Mexican vessels were burned. 23 
On October 20, Commodore Conner received word from Mrs. Franklin 
Chase, the wife of the American consul at Tampico, that the Mexican Comman-
dant General Anastasio Parrodi would evacuate the town on October 21, and 
that no resistance would be made to the American attack. 24 This evacuation, 
however, did not take place until October 27-28 and it was not until November 
10 that Conner was able to follow up on this information and move against 
Tampico. 
On September 22, Conner had received specific orders to occupy 
Tampico so that it might be used as a port of supply for General Taylor's 
troops who were moving south into Mexico. Accordingly on November 10, 11, 
and 12, the fleet, consisting of eleven vessels, sailed from Anton Lizardo with 
orders to rendezvous fifteen miles off Tampico. 25 Assembled there on 
November 14, the Squadron consisted of the frigates Potomac and Raritan; the 
steamers Mississippi, Princeton, Vixen, and the Spitfire; the schooners 
23Ibid., p. 1169. 
24smith, The War With Mexico, I, p. 279. Mrs. Chase's part in the 
victory at Tampico is somewhat obscure. She possibly spread rumors of a 
large landing party to the Mexican Commandant. Both she and her husband 
had sent Conner detailed plans of the forts, guns, and men defending the town. 
It is not known if Conner ever received them. If he did, he never gave Mrs. 
Chase credit for the information. 
25Ibid. 
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. Petrel, Bonita, and Reefer; the sloop St. Mary's; and the brig Porpoise. 26 
The landing force at Tampico consisted of three hundred Marines and 
sailors under the personal command of Commodore Conner. The initial move-
ment across the bar was led by Lieutenant W. E. Hunt, commander of the 
blockading vessels at Tampico, who acted as pilot for the expedition. The fort 
was passed with no signs of resistance, as the Mexicans had already with-
drawn. The Navy's work at Tampico was made easier because General Parrade 
did not believe in the war and readily had accepted Santa Anna's order to with-
draw further inland. Conner gave the Marines, under Captain Edson, the 
temporary responsibility of garrisoning the town. 
Soon after the occupation of Tampico, Conner received information that 
a considerable amount of supplies, munitions, and several boats had been left 
at Panuco, about eighty miles upriver from Tampico. A small expeditionary 
force, commanded by Commander Josiah Tattnall, consisting of Captain Edson, 
twenty Marines, and twelve sailors embarked on the Spitfire and Petrel and 
proceeded upstream to Panuco. There they destroyed a large amount of 
supplies -- including guns, and ammunition. The capture of Tampico and 
Panuco was important not only for military reasons but also because it was a 
psychological victory. The Panuco River penetrated far into the interior of 
Mexico and was navigable by small boats carrying supplies and the Mexicans 
had considered Tampico as one of their most important ports. 27 
26 RED .!_, p. 1172. 
27 Conner, The Home Squadron, p. 40. -·-
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The United States War Department, in anticipation of Conner's occupa-
tion of Tampico, had already ordered its occupation by the Army. On Novem-
ber 23, 1846, the steamer Neptune, with five hundred troops commanded by 
Colonel William Gates, arrived off Tampico, The same day Captain Edson 
formally turned over the command of Tampico to Colonel Gates. This success-
ful operation gave the Polk administration its much needed "victory news". 28 
Tampico also became the main base of supplies for the movement against Vera 
Cruz and Mex:ico City. 
Although the state of Yucatan was supposedly neutral during the Mexican 
War, United States Naval commanders kept watch over its more important 
ports. In accordance with this policy Commodore Perry, commanding the 
Mississippi, Vixen, Petrel, and Bonita, arrived off the town of Carmen, 
Yucatan on December 20, 1846. Carmen was a principal port situated at the 
opening to a large lagoon known as Laguna de los Terminos. The naval force 
occupied the town without resistance. Perry left the~ and the Petrel, 
under the command of Commander J. R. Sands, to blockade the port. Little 
attention was given to this port until May, 1847, when Perry would again 
return. 29 
President James K. Polk, and his advisors in Washington had by now 
become somewhat discouraged with the progress that General Taylor was 
making in his war by land. They decided that the best way to win the war was 
to strike at Mexico City by way of Vera Cruz. With this in mind, politics 
28Metcalf, United States Marine Corps, p. 118. 
29Ibid., p. 136. 
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were laid aside and General Winfield Scott was given overall command of the 
war with instructions to take Vera Cruz and move inland against Mexico City, 
as rapidly as possible. 
Any fleet approaching Vera Cruz from the sea, for the purpose of 
attacking the city, had to come under the guns of Forts Concepcion and Santiago 
which flanked the city. Such ships had to also contend with the famous fortress 
San Juan de Ulloa, situated on an island about one-half mile from the city. 
Construction on this castle fortress was begun in 158230 and was completed 
at a cost of approximately forty million dollars. 31 The castle was really 
several forts, and formed a polygon five hundred yards long facing Vera Cruz 
and the north channel. The walls, approximately five feet thick, were con-
structed of soft coral and faced with hard stone. The fortress was provided 
with sufficient storerooms and powder magazines to support four hundred 
pieces of ordinance found in it. 32 It would accommodate five thousand men 
with sufficient small arms. Water was supplied by seven cisterns which held 
· 33 
more than a thousand cubic feet of water. 
There was a considerable difference of opinion among the numerous 
30 John Frost, Pictorial History of Mexico (Philadelphia: Thomas 
Cowperthwait and Co., for James A. Bill, 1848), p. 468. 
31Frank Bennett, The Steam ~ ~ ~ United States (Pittsburg: 
Warren and Co., 1869), p. 95. 
32P. s. P. Conner, "The Castle of San Juan.de Ulloa and the Topsy-
Turvyists," ~ United States Service (February, 1897), p. 13. 
33Frost, Pictorial History of Mexico, p. 468. 
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Mexican War historians as to the defensive condition of San Juan de Ulloa at the 
outset of the war with Mexico. 34 General Winfield Scott, commander of the 
Army forces at Vera Cruz, and Commodore Conner solved the problem in a 
simple manner -- they bypassed the castle and attacked Vera Cruz by a round-
about method. This was accomplished by an amphibious landing out of range 
of the castle's guns. 
General Scott had arrived at Brazos, Texas, on January 1, 1847, with 
orders to take Vera Cruz and proceed from there to Mexico City if the Mexi-
cans continued to fight after the capture of Vera Cruz. With these goals in 
mind, Scott began his build up of troops and equipment. A large part of 
General Taylor's army was withdrawn and placed under Scott. A large fleet 
of transports was assembled; and all the necessary equipment for this large 
scale landing operation, including long seige guns, was provided or arranged 
for. Sixty-five surf boats, each thirty five feet long, were constructed for 
use as landing barges. 35 
From Brazos, Scott's expedition sailed to Lobos Island, 120 miles 
northeast of Vera Cruz, for final training and coordination of plans with the 
Navy. The expedition was assembled by the end of February and was then 
. f 
convoyed to the Home Squadron's anchorage off Anton Lizardo on March 5, 
1847. Scott and Conner now completed their plans for the invasion. Conner 
34conner, San Juan de Ulloa. This article deals with the controversy 
concerning vulnerability of San Juan de Ulloa and whether it really posed a 
threat to United States forces. 
35Maclay, United States~. p. 106. 
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suggested that the Navy could better carry the troops into the harbor for the 
final assault than could the Army transports; to this Scott readily agreed. 
General Scott and Commodore Conner worked out an elaborate flag system of 
communication between the Army and Navy, as well as regular c6mmunication 
between naval vessels. For an practical purposes, however, the landing at 
Vera Cruz was a naval operation. 36 
On March 7, aboard the Petrita, Commodore Conner accompanied by 
General Scott and his staff, pointed out the most suitable location for the 
landing -- the beach of Collado37 some three miles southeast of Vera Cruz. 
It has already been noted that this landing site completely bypassed the fortress 
of San Juan de Ulloa and rendered it ineffective for the protection of Vera 
Cruz -- and simultaneously allowed an attack against the city from its weakest 
point -- by land. 
On March 9, 1847, a fleet of approximately one hundred ships, com-
prised of war vessels and transports and carrying 12,603 men, horses, and 
equipment, was assembled off Vera Cruz. 38 At sunrise the steamers Vixen 
and Spitfire, accompanied by the gunboats Petrel, Bonita, Reefer, Falcon, 
and the Tampico, ran in close to shore to cover the landing operation. From 
sunrise to eleven a. m., the Army. was transferred to the naval ships; from 
two p. m. until six, troops were loaded on the surf boats each carrying from 
36 Conner, The ~ Squadron, p. 18. 
37Ibid., p. 46. 
38Maclay, United States Navy, p, 106. 
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fifty to eighty men. The first wave of troops, 4,500 men, landed in the surf 
boats at six p. m. By ten that night, approximately ten thousand men, with 
their equipment and supplies, had been landed and were in their respective 
positions. The Marines of the Home Squadron were in the first landing wave. 
The entire operation had taken only sixteen hours39 and was one of the first 
amphibious landings in American military history. 
The following day, March 10, still mQre troops and equipment were 
landed. Immediately the work of surrounding Vera Cruz began. By March 15, 
the investment was complete, and the Army had a defensive line from the 
landing beach, in a broken line, to Vergara northwest of Fort Concepcion. 
Inside this line, about seven hundred yards from Vera Cruz, were the gun 
batteries. The railwl'.!,y and all roads were occupied, and the visible water 
supply to the city was cut off. For the next few days, as the "northers" per-
mitted, horses, artillery, and additional supplies were unloaded at Collado 
beach. 40 
There were many problems. The sand hills and the needle-sharp 
chaparral made life miserable for the toiling soldiers and sailors -- acting as 
draft animals to pull the guns into position, because Scott had not received the 
number of animals he needed. Nor had the bulk of the artillery arrived, 
especially the long seige guns, and Mexican irregulars, both cavalry and 
·infantry, harrassed the American troops. Despite these difficulties, three 
39conner, The Home Squadron, p. 20. ----
40smith, The War With Mexico, II, pp. 27-28. ---
batteries, mounting 10-inch mortars, were ready by the early afternoon of 
March 22, "· .. the soldiers felt eager to hear what they called the 'sweet 
music' of those' faithful bull dogs. 1141 
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On the same day General Scott formally demanded the surrender of the 
town but his proposal was refused by the Mexicans. On March 21, 1847, 
Commodore Conner transferred the command of the Home Squadron to his 
successor, Commodore Matthew C. Perry. 42 The same day that Perry took 
command of the squadron General Scott asked for a battery of heavy guns 
from the Navy. Conner had previously st;1.ggested the use of these guns, but 
Scott had refused, hoping that his own siege guns would arrive. Perry agreed 
to the request, but insisted that they be manned by naval crews. By March 24, 
the battery was ready to fire. This was the heaviest American battery at Vera 
Cruz, as it had three 68-pounder shell guns, and one 32 .. pound solid shot 
gun. 43 Eventually there was a total of seven batteries firing at Vera Cruz 
and the two forts, Concepcion and Santiago. The early stages of the bombard-
ment made a spectacular scene by day and night -- but accomplished little of 
military value. Throughout the first stages of the assault the citizens appar-
ently remained in high hopes that they could resist successfully. 
When the big guns of the naval battery, which were close enough to fire 
point-blank, began to cut away the wall, the Mexicans, according to later 
41Ibid., p. 29. 
42 HED .!, p. 1181. 
43 Conner, ~ Home Squadron, p. 47 fn 4. 
reports, realized they were in serious trouble. Too, no help had arrived 
from the inland, and the Mexican irregulars were unable to penetrate the . 
American lines. While the Army was bombarc;ling Vera Cruz, the Navy was 
carrying on a hit-and-run battle with the two forts and the castle of San Juan 
de Ulloa. As a result of this combined action the Mexicans were ready, on 
57 
the morning of March 26,. to surrender. In the afternoon of the 26th, six men, 
three Mexicans and three Americans met and exchanged propositions. The 
next day, March 27, 1847, the Articles of Capitulation were signed, and on 
March 29 Vera Cruz and San Juan de Ulloa were occupied by the Army and the 
Navy. 44 Although he had formally relinquished the command of the Squadron 
to Perry, Commodore Conner had remained until the occupation of Vera Cruz 
was completed. It then became his privilege to carry the news of this success-
ful operation to Washington D. C. Conner had served as commander of the 
45 Home Squadron from December 21, 1843 through March 21, 1847. Conner's 
personal report to Washington was important at this time because there was 
consi.derable complaint about American brutality in bombarding Vera Cruz 
and its civilian population. The actual loss of life was not large considering 
46 
that the bombardment lasted three days. 
By way of summary as to the Navy's role in the successful capture of 
44 · 
~.!,pp. 1185-1187. 
45 Conner, ~ Home Squadron, p. 37. 
46semmes, Afloat and Ashore, p, 142. Smith, Vol. II, p. 33, gives 
the total figure at approximately two hundred killed and an undetermined num-
ber wounded. 
Vera Cruz, Conner reported that, 
"The operations of the navy in the descent on Vera Cruz 
embraced the following: The reconnaissance of the coast in the 
vicinity .of Vera Cruz, that a fitting place for the debarkation 
might be discovered; the convoying of the fleet transports; the 
piloting of the same to safe anchorage; the organization and man-
ning of the flotilla of surf-boats; the transhipment of the troops 
from the chartered vessels to the men-of-war; the transporta-
tion of the army thus embarked from AntJn Lizardo to the place 
of landing (the beach of Collado, opposite the island of Sacrificios); 
the conveyance of the flotilla of surf-boats to the place of landing, 
their arrangement upon reaching that point; the transfer of the 
troops into them; the landing of the army with its baggage, horses, 
artillery, and provision, and the covering of the same by the guns 
of the men-of-war, togi~er with the continuance of the blockade· 
of the city and castle, 11 
58 
With the fall of Vera Cruz, General Scott immediately made plans to 
move on Mexico City. With this in mind Scott asked Perry to help him secure 
a large number of horses which the Mexicans· had gathered at Alvarado. Perry 
then began preparations for the Navy's third attempt to occupy that town, He 
dispatched Lieutenant Charles G. Hunter, in the steamer Scourage, to blockade 
the port. Perry was to follow with a larger naval force, while General John 
A. Quitman was to cut off the Mexican retreat by land. Lieutenant Hunter 
arrived off Alvarado on March 30, and observing the Mexican forces leaving 
the town he began an immediate attack. The next day he occupied Alvarado, 
capturing sixty guns and four schooners. Thirty five of these guns were 
eventually shipped to the United States as war mementos. 48 
Hunter left a small detachment, of one midshipman and five men, to 
47 Conner, The ~ Squadron, p. 20. 
48 ·Maclay, United States Navy, p. 114. 
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garrison the town while he pursued the enemy upriver to the town 0f Tlachalpa; 
which he also took without resistance. He had accomplished the major part of 
the expeditions goal before either Perry or Quitman arrived. Lieutenant 
Hunter had committed one small error .. He had allowed the Mexicans to escape 
with the horses that Quitman wanted, not to mention that a lieutenant had ac-
complished what a general and a commodore had desired to do. The result for 
Lieutenant Charles G. Hunter was a court martial and dismissal from the 
. 49 service. 
Quitman's thwarted opportunity to obtain horses and glory offered a 
great' deal of amusement to the American public. The~~ Sun's May 7, 
1848 edition carried a poem about the episode: 
"On came each gay and gallant ship, 
On came the troops like mad, oh! 
But not a soul was there to whip, 
Unless they fought a shadow. 
Five sailors sat within a fort, 
In leading of a lad, oh! 
And thus was spoiled the pretty aport 
Of taking Alvardo. 11 50 
Lieutenant Hunter was reinstated to his commission by President Polk, but 
was dismissed later from the service for misdemeanors by President Franklin 
Pierce. Yet his actions had made possible the occupation of Alvarado. Cap-
tain Isaac Mayo, USN, was made governor of the town, He commanded a 
49Ibid. See also filfil) !, p. 1190; Bennett, The~~. p. 97. 
"In the United States Hunter was giv€ln many dinners and receptions, and as 
"Alvarado Hunter" was the hero of the hour .•. " 
50 Metcalf, United States Marine Corps, p. 121. 
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, 
detachment of Marines and sailors, which were reinforced by additional Ma;.. 
rines, at various times, from then until 1848 when they were withdrawn. 51 
Commodore Perry next continued with his orders to blockade the Mexi-
can East Coast ports by making preparations to attack the port of Tuspan. 
This was the only remaining port of any consequence not already in American 
hands. Tuspan was defended by two forts, one on the right bank and one on 
the left bank of the river. The fort on the left bank contained several of the 
guns taken from the sloop Truxton which had capsized the year before at the 
port. Tuspan also was defended by 650 Mexican soldier.s commanded by 
General Martin Perfecto de Cos, the brother-in-law of Santa Anna. 52 
On April 18, 1847, Commodore Perry in the Spitfire led the attack on 
Tuspan; he had fifteen hundred seamen and Marines, including officers, sup-
ported by four pieces of land artillery. Captain Samuel Livingston Breese 
commanded the landing party. As soon as the landing party was within range, 
the Mexicans opened an ineffective fire. The results were as expected: 
American losses were three killed and eleven wounded -- five officers and six 
seamen. 53 The Truxton' s guns were recovered and the two forts and their 
remaining guns were destroyed. Commodore Perry left a small detachment of 
54 Marines, supported by the Albany and Reefer, to garrison Tuspan. 
51Ibid. 
52 Maclay, United States ~, p. 114. 
53HED .!, pp. 1192-1193. 
54 . 
Ibid. , p. 1193. 
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In May of 1847 Commodore Perry paid a second visit to Carmen and 
Lagqna de los Terminos. Commander G. A. Magruder was designated as port 
commander and governor of the surrounding area. There were several rea-
sons why an American naval force was present and in command of this neutral 
territory. On several occasions the Yucatan government had requested 
American protection for the white inhabitants from the depredations of the in-
land Indian tribes. As the war progressed, the United States became even 
more interested in an interoceanic communications route across the Isthmus 
of Tehuantepec. This area also offered fresh supplies, fruit, vegetables, and 
meat for the naval crews. For these reasons, and possibly others, a strong 
Marine garrison was maintained at Laguna de los Terminos and nearby 
Alvarado until July 26, 1838. 55 
Some six months had elapsed since Perry's first visit to Frontera and 
Tobasco. . Conditions became such that Perry deemed it necessary to send an-
other expedition to impress upon the populace of that area proper respect for 
United States authority. On his first visit Perry had been unable to leave a 
garrison to occupy either town; as a result they had been reoccupied by enemy 
forces. On June 13, 1847, Perry's second expedition56 of fifteen ships, eleven 
hundred men, and ten pieces of artillery were anchored off Point Frontera at 
55Metcalf, United States Marine Corps, pp. 136-137. 
56 · · 
Bennett, The SteaJD. ~, p. 97. Bennett gives Perry credit for 
organizing the firstNaval Brigacle; in this he is mistaken since Commodore 
Robert F .. Stockton had used the same tactics a year earlier in California. 
HED !, pp. 1037-1054. 
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the mouth of the Tobasco River. 57 
Included in the ten artillery pieces were three guns, one each from the 
bomb vessels Vesuvius, Stromboli, and Etna. These guns are of particular 
interest because of their tremendous size. They were rated as 85-pounders58 
which is the largest naval gun referred to in any of the accounts of the Mexican 
War. 
The excellent results obtained at Vera Cruz with the surf boats as 
landing craft were not lost on Perry. He borrowed several of these from the 
Army, mounted a light field piece on each one, and used them to cross the 
bar of the river. He also used them as mobile artillery for close protection 
for various landing parties. On the 14th the Scorpion, towing the Vesuvius, 
Washington, and the boats from the Mississippi and ~ Adams, led the way 
up the river; the Spitfire, with the Stromboli, Bonita, and the boats of the 
Albany was second. The Vixen, with the bomb ship Etna and the boats from 
~ ___,,,,,_. 
the Deoatur, Germantown, and the Raritan in tow, brought up the rear. On 
board the Scourage which was towing an American merchant ship, was Captain 
G. W. Taylor with his submarine mine designed to remove all obstructions in 
the river channel. 59 Obstructions encountered by the flotilla were actually 
removed by charges placed at either end of the obstruction and detonated by 
57HED !, pp. 1209-1210, 
58 Conner, The Home Squadron, p. 16. --....--
59HED 1, p. 1209. See also Knox, History.~~ United States Navy, 
p. 177, fn-.--
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electric wires connected to a battery on board the Soourage. 
On June 18, just beyond Devil's Bend at a point known as Seven Palms, 
Perry in just ten minutes landed his entire assault force of eleven hundred 
men and artillery. This was made possible by preloading into the surf-boats 
before moving upstream. The flotilla, commanded by Commander Abraham 
Begelow continued upriver to a point just 1::/elow Fort Iturbide. Perry had 
landed nine miles below the city of Tabasco -- nine rugged, fatiguing miles. 
His column entered San Juan Bautista just after four on the afternoon of June 
15, 1847. 60 
At various points along the river and at the fortifications before the 
city of Tabasco, the landing force was fired upon by troops hidden in the brush. 
Only one man was killed, six wounded, and three were missing in action on 
this expedition which had eight surgeons in attendance. 61 All reports indicate 
that the· Mexican forces numbered fourteen hundred men, of w]:wm only thirty 
were killed. 62 The expedition seized and destroyed a large amount of military 
supplies. 63 Perry left four vessels, the ~. Spitfire, Scorpion, and the 
Scourage, and a force of 115 Marines and 205 sailors to occupy, patrol, and 
60Ibid. , p. 1210; 
61Ibid., p. 1214. 
62Ibid., p. 1211. 
63rbid. Commander Alexander Slidell Mackenzie's report is found on 
pages 1216-1218; Lieutenant William J.,. Blanton's report is on pages 1220-
1221. 
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keep the peace at Tobasco. 
Perry departed from San Juan Bautista on the morning of June 22, and 
proceeded to rejoin the flotilla at Frontera. From there the expedition return-
ed to Anton Lizardo for supplies. On June 26, Perry sent a report to Secre-
tary Mason on the successful expedition against San Juan Bautista, along with· 
a request that a strong reinforcement of Marines, four hundred men and four 
small boats be sent to the Home Squadron in order to garrison San Juan 
Bautista properly. 64 
His fears were well founded for on June 26, Commander Gershom J. 
VanBrunt, commander of the occupation force at San Juan Bautista, sent word 
that the guards stationed in the Plaza had been attacked by approximately 150 
Mexicans the night bef <;>re. The next day they were again fired upon by about 
seventy enemy hidden near a church. The Americans suffered no losses while 
the Mexicans had one man killed and one wounded. Commander VanBrunt's 
report further stated that there were rumored to be five to eight hundred enemy 
troops in the vicinity for the purpose of driving out the American occupying 
force. Possibly, due to bad weather this supposed attack did not materialize. 
On June 30, Commander Bigelow, with 240 men and two field pieces, 
marched upstream to the village of Tamultay where approximately five hun-
dred Mexicans had entrenched themselves. This force was dispersed with the 
loss of only two Americans killed and five wounded. 65 
64Ibid. , pp. 1221-1222. 
65Maclay, United States Navy, p. 117. 
65 
Very early in the war Congress had proposed that the war on land . 
should be fought by volunteers of short enlistment. Despite the fact that the 
enlistment of more than three thou.sand of Scott's men wpuld expire in one 
year's time, Congress had Jailed to make adequate provision for their replace-
ment. Not until March 30, 1847, one day after the capture of Vera Cruz, did 
Congress authorize the raising of ten regiments for the Army. At the same 
time the Marine Corps was authorized an additional twelve company grade 
officers and one thousand enlisted men. An authorization for the organization 
of a Marine contingment to be assiged to Scottis army was issued May 21, 
1847. This Marine regiment was to be composed of a skeleton cadre from the · 
Home Squadron and filled with new recruits, with officers appointed to com-
mand them. Lieutenant Colonel Samuel E. Watson was placed in command of 
this regiment, with Major Levi Twiggs ae second in command; Major William 
Dulany of this regiment was the only fieldgrade officer of the Corps who saw 
action and survived. The regiment sailed for Mexico soon after it was orga~ 
nized and was placed under the command of Brigadier General Franklin 
P . 66 1erce. · 
Perry immediately wrote the Secretary of the ;Navy protesting the 
· order to assemble the 190 Marines in the Squadron, who were disl)ersed up 
and down the coast for nearly six hundred miles, and placed under General 
Scott's command. He only partially complied with the order by sending only 
twenty eight Marines and one officer to General Pierce -- they were the only 
66Metcalf, United States Marine Corps, p. 1,26. 
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ones aboard ship at Vera Cruz. 67 
On July 16, General Pierce's brigade left Vera Cruz to join Scott's 
army at Puebla. Pierce's command was·in reality only a battalion. On the 
march the Marines were assigned the task of serving as· rear guard. . By the 
time Pierce's command reached Puebla, through hub-deep sand and three days 
of tropical downpouring ot rain, it had skirmished with the enemy six times. 
Upon their arrival at Puebla, the Marines were attached to General Quitman's 
Fourth Division and, along with the Second Pennsylvania Volunteers, were 
formed into a brigade with Lieutenant Colonel Samuel Watson in command. 
This brigade was not immediately sent into action; consequently the Marines 
did not partake in the initial assaults at Pedregal (lava flow), Cherubusco, 
and El Molino del Rey. 68 
At Chapultepec the Marines, as a large unit. proved their worth. On 
September 13, 1847, Major Levi Twiggs, with 120 Marines, led an assault on 
the steep southern side of the castle. Marine Captain John G. Reynolds and 
his pioneer party of seventy men bearing ladders, crows, an<;l pickaxes made 
up the lead unit of Twigg's storming party. Unfortunately Major Twiggs, who 
was anxious to fight, was killed before the actual assault began. On General 
Quitman's order the Marine l3attalion advanced and successfully stormed their 
67 Ibid. , p. 127. 
68Ibid., pp. 128-129. 
67 
assigned part of the castle. 69 According to M. Almy Aldrich, "The palace 
was overrun with escaped convicts, and other desperate characters, bent on 
plundering." Lieutenant Colonel Watson, with his Marines, was ordered to 
clear the palace of these intruders and to protect it from spoilation. 70 In the 
· storming of the castle and the fight for Mexico City, the Marines lost a total of 
seven men killed and twenty-one wounded. 71 
Marine Captain George H. Terrett, with seven officers and thirty-six 
men made history for the Marine Corps outside the walls by dispersing approx-
imately one thousand enemy troops; while in hot pursuit of the fleeing Mexicans 
he was joined by a then almost unknown Army Lieutenant ...... Ulysses S. Grant 
-- and about twenty soldiers who were also chasing fleeing Mexicans. 72 The 
Marines, attached to General Quitman's force, fought their way into Mexico 
City over the Tacuba causeway, the same route which Hernan Cortez had 
retreated on the memorable Noche Trista (night of sorrows), on December 26, 
1520. 73 General Quitman's force was the first to enter the city, and to them 
was given the honor of raising the American flag over "The Halls of 
69collum, History of the United States Marine Corps, p •. 94. 
70M. Almy Aldrich, History of the United S~ Marine Corps (Boston: 
Henry L. Shepard and Co., 1875), p. 105. 
72 Metcalf,. United States Marine Corps, pp. 132-133. 
73 Semmes, Afloat and Ashore, p. 461. -, 
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Montezuma. 1174 
A second Marine battalion, under Major John Harris, arrived at Vera 
C:ruz after the· armistice was signed. This battalion was immediately sent to 
aid in garrisoning Alvarado, Carmen, and Laguna de los Terminos. The first 
Marine Battalion was returned to Pensacola, Florida, in Jurie, 1848. In July 
general orders were issued.for the return of all Marines remaining in Mexico; 
the second Marine Battalion withdrew from Laguna de los Terminos on July 26, 
1848, and sailed for Boston, Massachusetts, and Norfolk, Virginia. 75 
For the Home Squadron, other than blockade service, the war with 
Mexico was over after the second expedition to Tobasco on June 16, 1847. 
The Navy's role in the continued occupation of Tampico was one of support 
and· acting as a depository for the public funds derived from the customs 
revenue; the Petrel was assigned to this task. 
Tuspan was held under blockade by the sloop.John Adams. Alvarado 
and Frontera were still occupied by naval forces who were having minor 
clashes with guerilla bands. During the closing months of 1847, the blockade 
was made more difficult because of a shortage of ships and insufficient crews, 
to man those available. Perry at this time had twenty ships of all classes with 
which to patrol, blockade, and occupy the Mexican.East Coast ports from 
74collum, History _2!, ~ United States Marine Corps, p. 95. 
75 Metcalf, United~ Marine Corps, pp. 136-137. 
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Matamoros to Cam.peche in Yucatan. 76 
The· early months of 1848 continued the problems encountered in 1847. 
The Navy was called upon to act as a peacemaker between the Maya Indians 
and the white Yucatecos at Compeche and its surrounding area, however~ 
Probably the·greatest battle the Navy fought during 1848 was the battle of the 
vomito (yellow fever), 77 
Late in May, 1848, Perry received official notice that the Treaty of 
Guadalupe Hiqalgo had been ratified by Mexico. He immediately took steps to 
. end the naval occupation of the ports and to return the .customhouses to the 
Mexican authorities. The Navy also was responsible for the embarkation and 
shipping home of some 18,000 Army troops assembled at Vera Cruz. On 
June 15, 1848, after routing all remaining ships of the squadron to home ports, 
Perry sailed for New York. A small force was left at Carmen, Yucatan until 
July 30, 1848, at which time ·it was recalled. The Mexican War for the United 
States Navy was officially over. 78 
From the earliest part of the war the Navy had not only helped to sup-
ply General Taylor's army, but had also protected them. The Army's capture 
of Vera Cruz would in all probability have failed except for the supporting role 
of the Navy. Its transportation of Army troops and the landing of them at 
Collado beach, below Vera Cruz, was for many years considered a model for 
76HED 1, pp. 1233-1237. --,-- ..,.. 
77samuel Eliot Morison, '-'Old Bruin" Commodore Matthew Calbraith 
. Perry, .!1.!!i ... ~ (Boston: Little, Brownand Company, 1967), pp. 243-249. 
78Ibid. , pp. 249-251. 
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combined landing operations. A total of forty-E;Jeven general orde.rs were 
· issued, and twenty-two separate flag signals had been arranged for this one 
operation. The methods, precision, and speed which characterized this land-
ing operation surpassed any previous embarkation of an army up to that time. 
In fact it is doubtful if there was a total landing operation to compare with it 
until World War II. 79 
Commodore Perry's superb handling of the river operations against 
San Juan Bautista and Alvarado, as well as the blockading of Tampico and 
Tuspan, and Carmen, Yucatan, all demonstrated that the Navy carried out the 
responsibilities as$igned to it. The Navy lost far more men to yellow fever 
than to combined enemy action. To their great credit the naval crews in face 
of numerous obstacles accepted every challenge offered to them. Although 
· life on board ship was far from pleasant there were very few incidents of 
desertion or trouble. One incident was recorded of a seaman who attacked an 
officer and was hanged for his trouble. SO 
79 Conner,. The Home Sguadron, p. 45. 
SOMorison, "Ql& Bruin," p. 190. · 
CHAPTER iV 
GENERAL SUMMARY 
The two squadrons, the Pacific and the Home Squadron, acting under 
separate orders, and several thousand miles apart, make an interesting 
comparison. Both squadrons were successful in their blockade techniques 
and both accomplished this wtth a minimum of ships and personnel. The 
Pacific Squadron, though not plagued by yellow fever, had the same problem 
with scurvy as did the Home Squadron. Of the two squadrons the one in the 
Pacific probably felt the critical shortage of supplies more than did the Home 
Squadron. Several of the Pacific Squadron crews were gone from their' heme 
ports for more than three years and the shortage of supplies placed them in 
harsh circumstances at times, It will be remembeted that at one time it was 
necessary for a crew to make shoes out of ships canvass. A shortage of 
small arms was felt in both squadrons and to relieve this situation Conner 
asked for an additional five.hundredmuskets for his command while the 
Pacific Squadron was finally supplied with new muskets by the Army. 
In both squadrons the crews were called upon to form naval brigades 
and to engage in a type of warfare for which they were neither trained nor 
· equipped .. Fortunately most of them l<>oked on this shore duty as a welcome 
relief from the bored0m of bl0ckade service. It must be said, in all fairness, 
that most of the officers and the crews quickly mastered the landing techni-
ques. The small Marine detachments assigned to each ship quickly justified 
their existence as a fighting organizati.on. · 
71 
72 
The Pacific Squadron was the conquering and occupying force in the 
· campaigns for Upper and Lower California motivated by a sense of "manifest 
destiny" that did not exist in the Home Squadron. Neither was there the 
struggle for command in the Gulf Squadron that existed in California between 
. . 
the Army and Navy and between officers within both biranches of the armed 
forces. Possibly it was because the principal characters involved, in the 
Home Squadron, were not as colorful as a Sto<1kton, Fr~mont~ or a Kearny. 
Maybe a sense of history was stronger among the men who acquiredCalifornia 
for the United States. 
On the other hand there are Perry, Taylor, and Scott all of whom were 
very much aware that.the-war could become a means whereby they could gain 
more responsible and prestigious commands. For Taylor it was the Presi-
dency of the United States; for Perry it was the opening of Japan, in 1852, for 
commercial trade to the Western World. · Winfield Scott retired from the army 
in 1861 having failed to attain his more prestigious command -- that of 
becoming President of the United States. 
· Perhaps more important the Mexican War was a training period for the 
officers of the Navy and Marine Corps. Lieutenant David Farragut served 
under Commodore Perry in the Home Squadron. Lieutenants Charles Heywood 
and Jacob Zeilin, who served in the Pacific Squadron, became Commandants 
of the Marine Corps. 1 
Lieutenant Raphael Semmes, noted for his history of the Mexican War~ 
1Metcalf, United States Ma.rine Corps, p. 227. 
73 
and Lieutenant John A. Winslow shared a cabin aboard the Raritan after they 
had lost their own ships on a Mexican reef. In the Civil War Captain Semmes 
commanding the Confederate Ship Alabama, and Captain Winslow co:mmanding 
they. §_. _§. Kearsage engaged one another in a sea battle on June 19, 1864, 
off Cherboug, France. 2 
Another problem common to both squadrons in the bleckading of the 
Mexican ports was the weather. Probably the Home Squadron had the-worst· 
of it on the score of the weather, however, the Pacific Squadron was hindered 
greatly by summer storms. The Home Squadron had a more .difficult time in 
· its landing operations due to the numerous sandbars which lay at the mouth 
of the East Coast ports. Certainly it was a proving ground for what is now 
known as amphibious· landings as perfected by the United States Marine Corps. 
The Mexican War awakened the American government to the value of steam 
ships and the· need for modernizing its navy. In all probability there was more 
· international respect for the United States Navy .after the war, and especially 
after Vera Cruz, than existed before the war. 
2war of the Rebellion: Records of the Union and Confederate Navies - -- . --~---·-------(27 vols., Washington: Government Printing Offrne, 1896). For Raphael 
Semmes account see series I, Vol. III, pp. 649-651: for John A. Winslow's 
account see series I, Vol. III, p. 59. · 
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